Re: The Empress Alexandra Fights Back #4

Oh and just as an aside, I found the most timely quote, I believe it is Russian, that reminded me of Rasputin.  Though he was certainly not the moral idiot portrayed in most works on Russia, I have little or no patience with the man's swaggering peasant machismo that made him such a menace to himself and put at risk those individuals who refused to abandon him when he was in serious trouble.  

The saying is as follows: "You cannot light a fire in your lap, and not burn your pants."  

However, it was not the womanizing that destroyed the man, it was his lack of credibility.  What defense does a person who lives on the street have if they have been beaten or robbed?  None.  They have no credibility.  What credibility does a peasant in an Imperial Court setting have?  None.  

It was Rasputin's lack of credibility that made him such a useful tool for the Right, Center and Left in their efforts to discredit the throne.  That is what makes the crime against Rasputin so dreadful and I can't help but feel that this is the point Alix was trying to make.  She was not trying to defend a moral deviant as she had read every report on him and she was well aware that he had issues with women and with alcohol.  It was the unfairness of the attack on him, that in my mind, so offended Alix.  

There are levels of crime.  I remember the story a friend of mine told me.  She was starting her career as a criminal lawyer and she was given some advice by another lawyer who had left criminal law and was a successful corporate lawyer.  He told her that his first case as a criminal lawyer was defending a man who was clearly a petty criminal.  He was at a loss as to how he was going to defend this man as just looking at him one could tell he was guilty of the crimes he was accused of committing.  Then it came to the lawyer to ask the man if his mother was still alive and if she was would she be willing to testify for him.  The man agreed to let his mother testify.  The lawyer said that she was the perfect looking mother with glasses and gray hair and looked like a gentle little old lady.  She was so perfect looking that the lawyer did not bother to interview her prior to the trial.  Once she opened her mouth on the stand, within a few moments everyone in the court include the lawyer himself, realized that the man on trial was not the petty criminal, that his mother was.  The lawyer realized his case was lost and sat down.  He looked across at the prosecuting lawyer as the man rose to interrogate the mother.  He could see that the lawyer was going to break the woman down and make her admit that she was the one who had taught her son to be a criminal, even though the prosecuting lawyer had already won the case.  

He was excellent at his cross examination and it was not difficult in humiliating the old woman or breaking her down.  Just as he was about to expose her with dramatic gesturing, he accidentally struck the woman in the face and knocked off her glasses and as he was facing the jury he did not realize what he had done and then he stepped back and crushed those glasses with his shoe.

When he realized what he had done he became quiet and silence filled the court room.  All anyone could hear was the elderly lady crying.  As she could not see well without her glasses someone had to escort her to her seat in the court house.  The jury returned a verdict of "Not Guilty."  The lawyer said he learned at that trial that there are levels of crime and that the prosecuting lawyer's crime against the old woman had been greater than the petty crimes her son committed.  At least that is the way it appeared to the jury.  

I believe that example could apply to the persecution of Rasputin and to the Empress' reasons for his defense.  Rasputin's crimes were less criminal than the men who accused him.  More over, in the end it did not matter at all to the Right, Center or Left who Rasputin was or wasn't; he worked as the perfect vehicle that the opposition needed in order to attain power.  Again I don't think any of this was lost on the Empress.  She had lived through her own mistakes with Rasputin, and his mistakes with her and a plethora of plots and plotters for a decade not to know where the motivation was coming from or who the real target was.

Well I really got on a toot with Rasputin, I guess I am getting back into my Correspondence mode.  I will post next a quick view of the Empress and her Daughters and then on to the October 1915 correspondence.  Thanks again Historyfan for your sincere and wonderful observations.  

[Please, everyone - continue saving our planet. Help the environment. Go green!]

Irina was beautiful.  Grand Duchess Olga really resembled her, in my opinion.  I haven't read much about her, and her marriage to Felix, except the rumour that he was homosexual.  They had children, I believe, did they not?

Only one.  A daughter, Princess Irina Felixovna Yusupova.

Thanks Grand Duchess Ferah. 

Greg King has the Yusupova's daughter named Princess Xenia Felixovna, who the author says was named after the Empress Dowager.  Bebe, as she was called by her parents married Prince Nicholas Sheremetiev and they had a daughter, Tatiana who married Ilias Sfiris in Athens in 1965.  I believe, though I may be mistaken that Mme. Tatiana Sfiris has been recently granted Russian citizenship and has taken up residence in St. Petersburg.  Again I may be mistaken. 

Uhm, I couldn't really follow this, but, as far as I know Irina Felixovna Yussupova ('Bébé', daughter of Irina Alexandrovna and Felix Yussupov) married Nikolai Dmitrievich Sheremetev and they had one daughter - Xenia Nikolaevna. Now, this Xenia married Ilias Sfiris in Athens, on June 20th, 1965. And they had a daughter - Tatiana Sfiris, who was Ilias' daughter, not wife. And Tatiana married Alexis Giannakoupoulos, who she divorced; and then married Anthony Vamvakidis, and has two children from him(can't recall the names).
I could be wrong too, though. : ) I'm not a big expert on Irina&Felix and their descendants.

Irina was beautiful.  Grand Duchess Olga really resembled her, in my opinion.  I haven't read much about her, and her marriage to Felix, except the rumour that he was homosexual.  They had children, I believe, did they not?

Only one.  A daughter, Princess Irina Felixovna Yusupova.

Thanks Grand Duchess Ferah. 

Greg King has the Yusupova's daughter named Princess Xenia Felixovna, who the author says was named after the Empress Dowager.  Bebe, as she was called by her parents married Prince Nicholas Sheremetiev and they had a daughter, Tatiana who married Ilias Sfiris in Athens in 1965.  I believe, though I may be mistaken that Mme. Tatiana Sfiris has been recently granted Russian citizenship and has taken up residence in St. Petersburg.  Again I may be mistaken. 

Uhm, I couldn't really follow this, but, as far as I know Irina Felixovna Yussupova ('Bébé', daughter of Irina Alexandrovna and Felix Yussupov) married Nikolai Dmitrievich Sheremetev and they had one daughter - Xenia Nikolaevna. Now, this Xenia married Ilias Sfiris in Athens, on June 20th, 1965. And they had a daughter - Tatiana Sfiris, who was Ilias' daughter, not wife. And Tatiana married Alexis Giannakoupoulos, who she divorced; and then married Anthony Vamvakidis, and has two children from him(can't recall the names).
I could be wrong too, though. : ) I'm not a big expert on Irina&Felix and their descendants.

Thanks Tina I think you got it right and the Grand Duchess Ferah was correct.  I missed a generation and misquoted Greg King.  Thanks for clearing up my mistake.

Griffh - I that what I am going to post probably should be in the Rasputin thread - but I am currently reading The Saint who Sinned by Brian Moynahan.

I am in 1916.  Moynahan relates what is going on in Rasputin's life while he puts in the corresponding letters written to Nicholas at Stavka from Alexandra as a comparison.

Even in 1916 IMHO, Alexandra was drowning in Rasputin worship and her own sense of Imperial importance.  It is amazing to read the letters written to and about Rasputin and the testimony given about him after his death by Aaron Simanovich who was Rasputin's secretary and partner in bribery and other crimes.  (There are also excerpts from Spiridovich and the Okranha and the police files.)

It seems true that, with the absence of Nicholas from Petersburg during the latter part of the war, and with the unbridled enthusiasm and support of Alexandra, Rasputin appointed and dismissed minsters almost at will.

I know that you think that Alexandra was too savvy to be taken in, but her letters are an unbelievable mix of fawning over Rasputin, reprimands to Nicholas for not doing what Rasputin suggested fast enough and a crafty but syrupy"guilt trip" on her poor husband's head.

We know that Alexandra had been shown the reports of Rasputin's debauchery and manipulations, or at least Nicholas had, but she dismissed them out of hand as jealousy over his Imperial patronage.

I love what you are doing with this thread as you show us that Russia was indeed connected to Europe and that Russian society was as cosmopolitan as any other country's society in Europe.  Your section on the last winter "season" in St Petersburg has been fantastic!

There is no doubt from the letters exchanged between Nicholas and Alexandra that they had a deep love.  But the letters, especially during the Stavka period, show just how much she manipulated Nicholas and Rasputin manipulated her.  It is hard not to feel that she had a serious mental illness at this time that had been worsening over the years of her isolation from St. Petersburg society and the rest of the Romanov family.

I would like to ask one question of Alexandra, if I could.  "Why??"

[Hynes' Translation of Rasputin’s Interrogation by the Secret Police]

Griffh - I that what I am going to post probably should be in the Rasputin thread - but I am currently reading The Saint who Sinned by Brian Moynahan.

I am in 1916.  Moynahan relates what is going on in Rasputin's life while he puts in the corresponding letters written to Nicholas at Stavka from Alexandra as a comparison.

Even in 1916 IMHO, Alexandra was drowning in Rasputin worship and her own sense of Imperial importance.  It is amazing to read the letters written to and about Rasputin and the testimony given about him after his death by Aaron Simanovich who was Rasputin's secretary and partner in bribery and other crimes.  (There are also excerpts from Spiridovich and the Okranha and the police files.)

It seems true that, with the absence of Nicholas from Petersburg during the latter part of the war, and with the unbridled enthusiasm and support of Alexandra, Rasputin appointed and dismissed minsters almost at will.

I know that you think that Alexandra was too savvy to be taken in, but her letters are an unbelievable mix of fawning over Rasputin, reprimands to Nicholas for not doing what Rasputin suggested fast enough and a crafty but syrupy"guilt trip" on her poor husband's head.

We know that Alexandra had been shown the reports of Rasputin's debauchery and manipulations, or at least Nicholas had, but she dismissed them out of hand as jealousy over his Imperial patronage.

I love what you are doing with this thread as you show us that Russia was indeed connected to Europe and that Russian society was as cosmopolitan as any other country's society in Europe.  Your section on the last winter "season" in St Petersburg has been fantastic!

There is no doubt from the letters exchanged between Nicholas and Alexandra that they had a deep love.  But the letters, especially during the Stavka period, show just how much she manipulated Nicholas and Rasputin manipulated her.  It is hard not to feel that she had a serious mental illness at this time that had been worsening over the years of her isolation from St. Petersburg society and the rest of the Romanov family.

I would like to ask one question of Alexandra, if I could.  "Why??"

Alizx please forgive my delay in responding to the very important issues that you have brought up.  I so understand you "Why??." 

However, it is difficult to specifically address your points as we are still in mid-1915.    Would you be willing to keep a record of your points and share them when we get to 1916 we can specifically address those important issues?  I think that would be the easiest way of comparing different points of view of the influence of the Empress or her reliance on Rasputin. 

One of the aspects of Moynahan that I like the best is his translation of Rasputin's remarks, unlike Hynes translation, Moynahan makes Rasputin sound like the rough and coarse person he was.   


•   Hynes' Translation of Rasputin’s Interrogation by the Secret Police

10 August. At ten o'clock the following morning Rasputin came out of his house and began questioning the agents about yesterday's happenings, sighing and wondering at having got so drunk, since, according to his own words, he had had only three bottles of vodka.  He repeated over and over again: "Ah, my dear fellows, that was an ugly business” …He further said: "Your governor will soon be removed also, "and to the question, whether he was referring to Count Adelberg, replied:  "No, I don't know his name," and changed the conversation.  [Ref: From the Red Archives, Russian State Papers and other documents relating to the years 1915-1918, Translated by A. L. Hynes]

•   Moynahan’s Translation of Rasputin’s Interrogation by the Secret Police

He was up at 10:00 the next morning.  He asked the agents what had happened on the steamer trip, “gasping constantly and wondering how he could have gotten drunk on only three bottles of wine.  He was worried that word might get out to the tsar.  “See, fellow, he told an agent, “it’s not good the way it happened.” …“Your guv’nor will be sacked soon…”  The agents asked, “Which one?”  “No, I dunno what his name is,” Rasputin said, and changed the subject.   [Ref: Moynahan, Brian, Rasputin: The Saint Who Sinned, (1997), p. 234]

I can only speak to Moynahan's handling of events in 1915, such as the Tsar's desire to take over the Supreme Command.  While Moynahan does supply new research and fresh perspectives, I find him far less informed than Hew Stratham whose work was written half a decade later. 

Moynahan's version of the Tsar’s decision is the standard view which gives full credit to the Empress and Rasputin, stating that responsible members of the Duma and State Council, not to mention the Imperial family, were terrified by the move. 

Moynahan states that:

Thus, as tsar, who had led no more than a company as a young man, and whose knowledge of weapons systems was limited to the horse and saber, took responsibility for the six million men of a whipped and bleeding army.  From the rear his imperceptive and unbalanced wife reassured him that she and her Friend were in control.  “Do not fear for what remains behind,” she wrote.  “Don’t laugh at silly old wify, but she has ‘trousers’ on unseen...God will give me the strength to help you...& you have Grigory’s St. Nicholas to guard & guide you.”  The spectacle, a British observer wrote, was “amazing, extravagant and pitiful...and one without parallel in the history of civilized nations.” 

Who was to blame?  “The loathsome Rasputin,” Robert Wilton wrote privately to London, “played no small part in suggesting the tsar’s mystical motives for taking up the High Command.  Rasputin always works in the same way.  He tells the empress that he has had a vision that certain things must be done...The empress then retails this stuff to her husband and the trick is done.  It reminds one of...the Byzantine court.”  [Ref: Brian Moynahan, Rasputin: The Saint Who Sinned, (1997), p. 237]

I hope that I have been fair in presenting in just one quote, the gist of Moynahan’s argument as to why the Tsar took over the Supreme Command.   This explanation is used to as a building block that is vital to the argument that the cunning Rasputin had tremendous influence over the Tsar, who was an inexperienced nonentity, by manipulating the Ruler’s “unbalanced wife” who a Byzantine mystic.   Once this has been established, historians start building their case, step by step, to the Revolution.   

Now let’s examine the Tsar’s decision to take an advisory position with the Supreme Command at Stavka from another perspective.  Hew Stratham suggests that the Tsar’s decision cannot be separated from a decade of debate and struggle over the control or Russia’s military administration that started with Guchkov's attack in November 1907 when he set up his own commission for national defense which the Minister of War.
Strachan explains that the Tsar’s solution:

...the problems of the services was to strengthen both the army and navy ministries, and to appoint to them heads whose loyalty was to him and not to the Duma.  The general staff, which had proved just as secretive and obstructive as the other agencies, especially in its dealings with the War Ministry and the Council for State Defense, was reincorporated with the War Ministry in 1908, and V. A. Sukhomlinov was appointed chief.  In March 1909 Sukhomlinov became minister of war, with instructions from the Tsar not to attend the Duma.  Between 1909 and 1910 his powers as war minister were progressively reinforced.  Thus, just as the army was able to begin focusing on the external threat to the west, so at last it began to gain centralization and direction in its administration.  [Ref: Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume One: To Arms, (2003), p. 301]

Strachan states that, in spite of Sukhomlinov's personal and professional bad press, by 1914 the Minister of War:

...had the Russian army in a state far fitter for war than it had been in 1910.  What he had not overcome, as the personal vendettas reveal, were the deep internal divisions within the army.

One corollary of the enhancement of the War Ministry was the subordination of the general staff.  When the former took over responsibility for the latter once more, in 1909, Polivanov was appointed its chief.  But Sukhomlinov was convinced that Polivanov was still intriguing with Guchkov and so promoting the Duma’s authority over the army at the expense of the Tsar’s.  [Ref: Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume One: To Arms, (2003), pp. 301-302]

The Tsar’s successful restructuring of Russia’s national defense, which has apparently has lain hidden away and that impacts our own understanding of the Tsar’s assumption of the Supreme Command in August 1915, was the 1910 redrafting of Russia’s mobilization plans. 

Strachan states:

Because the mobilization plan dated from 1910 and was actually due for revision later in 1914 its contents were familiar and well rehearsed.  All was executed remarkably smoothly and often ahead of schedule...

Still open when the war was declared was the question of who would be commander-in-chief.  The Tsar clearly had himself in mind...it was implicit in his handling – and in the failure – of the Council for State Defense; he was to have acted as referee in the war games proposed for 1911.  The regulations for the field administration of the army in wartime, still in draft in July 1914 and hurriedly approved, implied that the Tsar would act as commander-in-chief, if not in the operational sense at least as a supreme political and military co-ordinator.   [Ref: Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume One: To Arms, (2003), p. 313]

All Russia west of the line from St. Petersburg to Smolensk, and along the Dnieper to the Black Sea, was placed under the direct authority of Stavka, the field headquarters.  The commander-in-chief was thus vested with absolute powers, including direction of the navy.  However, at their meeting of 18/31 July 1914 the Council of Ministers vigorously opposed the suggestion that Nicholas assume the command, arguing that defeat would threaten his personal position.  The following day the post was offered to Sukhomlinov, who refused on two grounds.  First, he was mindful of the legacy of Kuropatkin in the Russo-Japanese War, who had made just such a shift with disastrous consequences.  Secondly, he was anxious to minimize the disruption to existing arrangements in a time of crisis.  Finally, on 20 July/2 August, Grand Duke Nicholas accepted the command, albeit with the implication that he was no more than the Tsar’s proxy.  [Ref: Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume I: To Arms, (2003), p. 313] 

This explains why the Grand Duke Nikolai had so much power when he accepted the Supreme Command, which as Fuller states:

…gave Nikolai Nikolaevich dictatorial control over all administration both civil and military in the front zone.  Since he was not responsible in any way to the central government back in Petrograd, he was, for all intents and purposes, a second tsar.  [Ref: William C. Fuller Jr., The Foe Within, p. 177]

It also explains the Tsar’s growing irritation over the Grand Dukes’ arrogance and disregard to maintain the attitude as a stand-in for the Tsar.

Strachan’s careful reseach certainly makes it far more apparent that the Tsar did not decide to take his position as the supreme political and military co-coordinator of the Supreme Command in August 1915, but rather, the Tsar reasserted his right to that office that had been inherent in the July 1914 draft for the field administration. 

A serious consequence of the Tsar’s decision to yield to his Minister’s objections to his taking office as Supreme Command in July 1914 was the impact on the issue of supply.  Strachan explains that the Stavka possessed no section to administer supply because the:

...regulations for field administration had assumed that the minister of war would be subordinate to the commander-in-chief by virtue of that office being held by the Tsar.  The effect of the Tsar not assuming the command was therefore to divorce supply from operations.  An army group organization was established, the North-West Front for East Prussia and the South-West for Galicia.  With regard to the supply, the Fronts dealt directly with the ministry of war, bypassing Stavka.  Thus Stavka could plan operations while remaining totally oblivious to logistic considerations.  Already, in his pre-war planning for East Prussia, Danilov had shown scant regard for the question of supply.  This tendency was confirmed by the command structure.  Palitsyn comment of Stavka in May 1915:

They devote themselves mostly to operational matters, to strategy, to drawing maps.  Believe you me, all this strategy is playing in comparison with the problems with which they should occupy themselves before all other things: with the Etappen, the supply and provisioning of the army.  This is the fundamental in the war.

And when Stavka’s designs were confounded by supply problems, it could blame the minister of war.  Thus, even during the war itself the animosity between the Grand Duke and Sukhomlinov continued to cut across the search for constructive solutions.  [Ref: Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume I: To Arms, (2003), p. 314] 

While there were other factors that added to the question of shortages and delays, certainly Strachan’s research on the consequences of the Tsar’s decision to step down in July 1914 from assuming the Supreme Command gives us a deeper appreciation as to the nature of the Tsar’s restlessness that Alix attempted to soothe:

Letter No. 3. Tsarskoe Selo, Sept. 19-th 1914
…I know how deeply you have been suffering all this time - yr. restless sleep has been even a proof of it.  It was a topic I on purpose did not touch, knowing & perfectly well understanding your feelings, at the same time realising that it is better you are not out at the head of the army.

Clearly, if we accept Statham’s research, we see that the Tsar’s decision was based on the Grand Duke Nikolai’s abuse of his position as the Tsar’s proxy and the confusion that come from Nikolai’s interference in matters solely relating to the civil government.  The Tsar’s assumption of power also brought a solution to supply operations.  

However the most important implication of the Tsar’s decision was that it represented to the Duma and particularly Guchkov, who by the Summer of 1915 was openly plotting a Palace Revolution, that the Tsar was determined to keep the military administration in his hands and to keep it free of intrigue.    

Whether one agrees with the Tsar’s decision or not, Stratham’s research exposes the basic flaw of Moynahan’s assessment of that decision.  

Again let us look at Moynahan’s assessment of the Tsar:

Thus, as tsar, who had led no more than a company as a young man, and whose knowledge of weapons systems was limited to the horse and saber, took responsibility for the six million men of a whipped and bleeding army.  [Ref: Brian Moynahan, Rasputin: The Saint Who Sinned, (1997), p. 237]
 
Not only does Moynahan miss the point entirely, as the Tsar was acting in an advisory role, leaving all military decisions to General Alexeiev, but more importantly Moynahan apparently had no idea that the Tsar’s had created through his own reforms the centralization of the military administration which had in turn placed the military’s management on a firmer basis.  Most importantly Moynahan apparently had no idea that implicit in the Tsar’s reorganization of the military administration was his position in the Supreme Command in an advisory role or the implications of his absence in terms of supply issues.  

And in terms of the Empress attitude toward Nicky’s decision, we know that the Empress’s support for her husband’s determination to not to be talked out taking an advisory role at Stavka a second time by his ministers and the Duma, did not necessarily involve her complete approval of his move as her oft repeated requests that he move Stavka closer to St. Petersburg once he assumed command, seem to suggest.  

As far as Rasputin having taken credit for the Tsar’s decision, I would like to know what that braggadocios peasant didn’t take credit for.  And without going touching the Grand Duke’s refusal to act as proxy for the Tsar in his role as Commander-in-Chief which was one of the conditions of Nikolasha’s acceptance of that post, I believe Strachan’s understanding of Nicholas’ decision brings a real clarity to Tsar’s August 22, 1915 Rescript to the Grand Duke Nikolai.

The Tsar clearly states:

At the beginning of the war there were reasons of a political nature which prevented me from following my personal inclinations and immediately putting myself at the head of the army.  Hence the fact that I conferred upon you the supreme command of all the military and naval forces...

The hostile invasion, which is making more progress every day on the western front, demands above all an extreme concentration of all civil and military authority, unity of command during the war, and an intensification of the activities of the whole administrative services...  [Ref: Maurice Paléologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs, Vol. II, (1925), pp. 70-71]  

Alixz thank you so much for bringing these issues up for us to look at and we can discuss them in full when we get to 1916.  In the meantime you have really helped us review some important aspects already under our consideration in the Summer of 1915.  

I am so grateful that you ask the tough questions.  I am not trying to provide answers, but am exploring other points of view.  

Griffh - Thank you for letting me "spout off".  I know that what I wrote is more appropriate to the Rasputin thread and is a year ahead of your time line.

You have an enormous amount of information and an incredible array of sources.  It is no wonder that your whole thread on Alexandra fighting back is so well presented.

As you know Moynahan was more than "rough" in his writing.  I was amazed at the baseness of his presentation of Rasputin and his actions.  But then without carefully picked words, Moyhanan is telling us exactly what Rasputin did and said.

I have not read Hew Stratham (Strachan?)

But regarding Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich being the tsar's proxy.  Here on the forum, all moderators are in effect the FA's proxies.  We represent him and make decisions for him within the scope of our assignments. However, the final decision is always his.  I can send a thread to another sub forum and he can send it right back to me if he feels that I was wrong in my assessment of where it should be posted.

Did Nicholas do any of this type of "controlling" when he stayed, not in St Petersburg, but at Tsarskoe Selo while Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich was in charge as his "proxy" at Stavka?  

He should still have been in overall command as is our US President even though he is never in actual command in the field.

Did he have his hands on the pulse of what was going on?  Did he, as the mobilization plans provided, keep track of not only the advances and retreats, but the supply demands of the massive army?  Since, as proxy, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich was bypassed in this plan because the tsar was supposed to have been the one who was reported to, why wasn't Nicholas taking care of business in St. Petersburg?  Where were the supply ministers and why were they not reporting to him?

OK - I will put this aside and wait until you get to 1916.  It is the letters of Alexandra and their superstitious rubbish and her admonitions to "be like Peter and Ivan, that I wanted to talk about.  

So I'll see you in about a year (forum time).

OK - I will put this aside and wait until you get to 1916.  It is the letters of Alexandra and their superstitious rubbish and her admonitions to "be like Peter and Ivan, that I wanted to talk about. 

So I'll see you in about a year (forum time).

Alixz don't put this aside for a year.  I was wrong in asking you to do that.  It is really important to hear your perspective and it will be tremendously helpful.  We need your point of view.  I think my initial response was too narrow and I guess I was a bit overwhelmed.  But it is so important to hear your point of view.  So please stay and share your thoughts about 1916!!!!!

Griffh - Thank you for letting me "spout off".  I know that what I wrote is more appropriate to the Rasputin thread and is a year ahead of your time line.

You have an enormous amount of information and an incredible array of sources.  It is no wonder that your whole thread on Alexandra fighting back is so well presented. 

Spouting out is good!!!! 

As you know Moynahan was more than "rough" in his writing.  I was amazed at the baseness of his presentation of Rasputin and his actions.  But then without carefully picked words, Moyhanan is telling us exactly what Rasputin did and said.

I so agree with you and I think that Moynahan did us all a great service by giving us a more authentic Rasputin.  There are some issues as to the police reports, especially the reports produced during Beletsky's tenure as the Head of Police.  According to Margarita who has read all the current Russian scholars on Rasputin, he was not quite as colorful an individual as Moynahan protrays him to be. 

I have not read Hew Stratham (Strachan?)

Alixz I think you would really enjoy his book.  Strachan, thanks for the correction, is the first historian since the 1930's to write a complete history of the Great War.  So far he has just published the first volume, The First World War; Volume I, To Arms.  He tears apart so many false assumptions about Russia's prosecution of the war and puts a far more positive light on Russia's efforts and accomplishments.  The really helpful aspect of his work is that it is a comparative study.  Like Fuller, Strachan challenges most of statements that have been made about the War. 

I think his work is brilliant and it certainly gives Nicholas his due.  When you realize, after reading Strachan, that the Tsar's advisory role at Stavka was the result of his "war" with Gutchkov and the Duma to maintain his control of the military administration and that his reforms did strengthen the army through centralization, then you begin to understand the nature of the ministers objections.  If Nicholas found the courage and determination to not be talked out of taking his advisory role at Stavka, then the Duma, i.e. the Progressive Bloc move to gain control of the military administration were once again defeated by the Tsar.  This was nothing new, it had been going on since 1907. 

 

[Rodzianko on Grand Duke Nicholas’ Declining Status]

But regarding Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich being the tsar's proxy.  Here on the forum, all moderators are in effect the FA's proxies.  We represent him and make decisions for him within the scope of our assignments. However, the final decision is always his.  I can send a thread to another sub forum and he can send it right back to me if he feels that I was wrong in my assessment of where it should be posted.

Did Nicholas do any of this type of "controlling" when he stayed, not in St Petersburg, but at Tsarskoe Selo while Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholaevich was in charge as his "proxy" at Stavka? 

He should still have been in overall command as is our US President even though he is never in actual command in the field.

Did he have his hands on the pulse of what was going on?  Did he, as the mobilization plans provided, keep track of not only the advances and retreats, but the supply demands of the massive army?  Since, as proxy, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich was bypassed in this plan because the tsar was supposed to have been the one who was reported to, why wasn't Nicholas taking care of business in St. Petersburg?  Where were the supply ministers and why were they not reporting to him?

I don't believe that Nikolasha, once he "inherited" the Tsar's role at Stavka, was willing to share his power with anyone, least of all the Tsar. It was not since Nikolasha was the all powerful Chairman of the Council of State Defence, that he had access to such great power.  After he lost the position in 1908 and had been shuffled to the sidelines, I don't think there was any way he was going to loosen or lessen his hold on power, or include the Tsar in any of the military matters. 

Nikolasha's misuse of power not only irritated and frustrated the Tsar, it was this issue that, combined with the losses to the Germans, brought upon his dismissal.  Once Nikolasha alienated the State Council and the Duma his days were numbered. 


•   Rodzianko on Grand Duke Nicholas’ Declining Status

Confidence in the Grand Duke began to waver.  The inefficiency of the higher command, the absence of plan, the retreat, bordering on flight—all tended to prove the incompetence of the Chief of Staff, General Yanushkevitch.  The Grand Duke ought long ago to have replaced him by Alexeieff, who had been Chief of the Staff to General Ivanoff during out advance in Galicia, and was now Commander-in-Chief on the Western front.  Literally everyone advocated that name.  I wrote of this to the Grand Duke, urging him to remove Yanushkevitch and appoint Alexeieff in his place.  [Ref: M. V. Rodzianko, The Reign of Rasputin: An Empire’s Collapse, (1927), p. 149]


•   Sazonov on Nikolasha’s Incompetent Chief of Staff, Yanushkevitch

Sazonov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs…told us [GD Marie Pavlova Sr. and GD Andre] the following:
   
"General Ianushkevich [Chief of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief], takes unheard of liberties.  Under the circumstances it is quite impossible to do anything.  Let me illustrate by several incidents.  When the Allies decided to carry on operations at Gallipoli they asked us to take part.  This would not only have aided them but would have been of great importance to us, the principal beneficiaries in case Constantinople was captured.  After negotiations with the Staff of the Supreme Commander, the army corps of General Irmanov was brought
together at Odessa.  I received from the Staff even the list of the officers, which I passed on to the Allies, telling them that the expeditionary force was ready to start in a few days.  Some time later I learned quite incidentally that this corps was in Galicia.  When I reported to the Emperor, I called his attention to this matter, and he told me that he, too, had only recently and quite by accident, learned of this change from the Grand Duke Georgi Mikhailovich, whom be had appointed at the head of one of the battalions in the corps....  Imagine my position in regard to the Ambassadors of the Allies.  It must be remembered that this corps was detailed with the Tsar's authorization and all of a sudden, without even notifying him, the corps is moved to Galicia. His Majesty merely remarked that the whole army is at the service of the Supreme Commander and that it is difficult to interfere with his orders.
   
"Another incident took place in March. Bark [P. L.], Minister of Finance, received a telegram from Ianushkevich, informing him [Bark] that he was to send over to America, by January, 1916, 400 million rubles gold to pay for shrapnel.  Bark was almost bowled over.  The amount in question is one-third of our total gold fund.  Without consulting any one, they [Grand Duke and Ianushkevich] signed the contracts.  Such an attitude toward the finances of the country can lead only to the ruin of the treasury.  Poor Bark has not yet recovered from the shock.  In addition, he [Ianushkevich] has taken an impossible stand-in our Persian policy.  His Majesty found it necessary to send one [military] division to Persia, where our affairs are not advancing very well, as a punitive force in order to reestablish our prestige and to bring order out of chaos.  In reply Ianushkevich said that the division would not be sent.  Such an attitude toward the will of His Majesty cannot be tolerated, aside from the fact that under such conditions it is impossible to carry on a policy. As it stands we have two authorities at the same time, one excluding the other. . . . [Ref: Diary of Andrei Vladimirovitch, Alexander Palace Time Machine. Retrieved June 8, 2009, from http: /www.alexanderpalace.org/russiancourt2006/IV.html.]]

These concerns were already being aired in late July 1915, before the German's victory at Kovno on August 1-5, which according to contemporary sources was especially damaging to Nikolasha's reputation, or the fall of Poland on August 7, during which an entire garrison of 85,000 men was captured.  That was the final straw in the public's mind and popular opinion turned on Nikolasha after that. 

Again Alixz please stay with us and share your vital and very important insights.  I think that I will forego our saratorial history so that we can start on the October correspondence. 

Griffh - I meant "one year" forum time, not real time.

I thought you should finish your 1915 postings and my 1916 could wait until you got to that year. 

I just happened to read the Moynahan book and the comparison of what Rasputin was up to and the letters that Alexandra sent to Nicholas at Stavka telling him what "Our Friend" wanted him to do was very interesting.  It seemed as if she was just passing along information because she had become a religious zealot and believed that Rasputin was "close to God".  In fact Alexandra actually capitalizes the word "Him" when referring to Rasputin as if he were God.

I just got ahead of you and myself.  I can wait.

You know what does impress me, though, Nicholas has always been shown to be sitting around doing nothing while Rasputin and Alexandra ran the country, but from you have posted, Griffh, he was a man of thought and action.

He was doing what a tsar should do about setting up mobilization plans for future conflicts and worrying about supply lines, etc.

It makes him appear much more interested and involved in his work as tsar.  He had good ideas, he just let others talk him out of doing what he knew to be right.

He did more than just review troops and entertain heads of state.  There was substance under the shyness and reticence.  I don't want to make excuses for him, because in the end it was his actions, or lack of them, that led him and his family to Yekaterinburg.  But there is a glimmer of true autocrat in there.

Griffh - I meant "one year" forum time, not real time.

I thought you should finish your 1915 postings and my 1916 could wait until you got to that year. 

I just happened to read the Moynahan book and the comparison of what Rasputin was up to and the letters that Alexandra sent to Nicholas at Stavka telling him what "Our Friend" wanted him to do was very interesting.  It seemed as if she was just passing along information because she had become a religious zealot and believed that Rasputin was "close to God".  In fact Alexandra actually capitalizes the word "Him" when referring to Rasputin as if he were God.

I just got ahead of you and myself.  I can wait.

Oh great Alizx...I got it...one forum year.  I get so stupid sometimes.  But just know I am harmless.  I love the fact that like Janet and Helen and Historyfan you are right out there with your concerns and that they reflect issues that I so want to resolve fairly. 

It will be so interesting to explore your position about Alix and Rasputin when it comes up in 1916 and I feel that it will be vital to our understanding. 

Alixz I hope you will share your observations and concerns as we continue with the Oct. 1915 correspondence.  I have noticed, but I may be mistaken, that often Alix uses Rasputin "sainthood" in order to get Nicky to respond to some issue that concerns her and the Nicky is not interesting in or does not credit.  The other thing I have observed about how many historians have edited the Empress' excited and emotionally charged remarks in the 1915 correspondence, is that they never direct those remarks to the real issues that Alix is trying to articulate to Nicky, but instead insist that Alix concerns are the result of Rasputin's manipulation because she uses his name to plead her point. 

It may well be that all this changed in 1916 and that the Empress was clinging to Rasputin.  At the same time we have Lili Dehn's statement that Alix confided to her in 1916 that Rasputin would not obey the Tsar or her and refused to leave Petrograd.  We know, as I have often shared, that Alix had Ania silence the Strannik about his hatred of Nikolasha.  We also know that both Alix and Nicky were very displeased with Protoppov and wanted to remove him in 1917. 

We know that during times of crisis that Ministers came and went in rapid succession.  I believe that during the disturbances for 1904-1908 the the Ministry of the Interior saw as many or more changes as during the Great War and that the same was true of the office of Over Procurator. 

The other thing that I find helpful in understanding Alix, and which we shall witness for ourselves before long in the correspondence, is that as outspoken and insistent as she becomes about a concern of hers, she is equally quick to admit that she is wrong when something she has advocated turned out to be a mistake. 

But anyway lets see what unfolds. 
   


 

You know what does impress me, though, Nicholas has always been shown to be sitting around doing nothing while Rasputin and Alexandra ran the country, but from you have posted, Griffh, he was a man of thought and action.

He was doing what a tsar should do about setting up mobilization plans for future conflicts and worrying about supply lines, etc.

It makes him appear much more interested and involved in his work as tsar.  He had good ideas, he just let others talk him out of doing what he knew to be right.

He did more than just review troops and entertain heads of state.  There was substance under the shyness and reticence.  I don't want to make excuses for him, because in the end it was his actions, or lack of them, that led him and his family to Yekaterinburg.  But there is a glimmer of true autocrat in there.

WOW!!!  Alixz you have made some wonderful points here about Nicky and I don't think that you are making excuses for him.  In Asher's book on Stolypin and Harcave's book on Witte, in spite of the fact that neither Asher nor Harcave are at all sympathetic to the Tsar, they are so objective about both Stolypin and Witte, that quite by chance one gains a very different picture of Nicky. 

What begins to emerge is a picture of a young Ruler, who as early as the late 1890's trying to come to grips with improving the standard of living for Russia's poor peasants and how Witte processes the Tsar's request and later how Stolypin picks up Witte' s research and committee's accomplishments and furthers them.  You learn how the issue with the peasants becomes part and parcel of the creation of the Duma and increased civil rights for Russian subjects. 

These authors credit Nicholas with the intiative to call special councils together in 1905-1906 and details the members who were present and their view of the reforms discussed.  They share Nicky's views which are always consistent with what the majority feels.  These authors also inform us that it was Nicholas who chose the anniversary of the Borki Train crash to sign the October Manifesto and that the person who delayed the signing was Witte who did not show up until 5pm.   

These authors also down play Nikolasha's supposed support for reform and reveal the episode with his gun to be fictious and both authors fail to understand how anyone could consider such as the Grand Duke, who they label as an unbalanced hysteric, as holding liberal views.  After one finishes reading and studying those two books, one realizes that what ever the 26 year old Nicholas lacked in terms of political or administrive knowledge of the government, he had gained by 1906-1909 as he consciously called various ministers and his advisors together to discuss the most sensible approach to reform and to the safety of the nation during the reform process, and by his continuous and constant attention to the reports from the various ministries which he read carefully every day and made notations on.

It has been in the best interests of the liberal socialist bias that has controled the view of Nicholas to keep him a political non-entity with no real desire, interest or understanding of his rule.  When in truth it was Nicholas' ability to remain calm and thoughtful during crisis's and to carefully weigh the various solutions to difficult problems that acted as a saftey valve as he found his way through those various challenges. 

The one thing that caught Nicky in it's snare was the lack of honor or loyalty that occurred during the Great War.  I think that with few exceptions, Stolypin was the last truly loyal statesman.  This lack of honor or loyalty is something, I believe, that as early as 1915, the Empress was intuitively sensing. 

But there are so many issues here and I certainly not fully informed.  Thanks so much Alixz for your great observations. 

   

     

This lack of honor or loyalty is something, I believe, that as early as 1915, the Empress was intuitively sensing. 

Oh, I think it was earlier than 1915.  I truly believe she had "them" pegged all along.

As to Nicholas, I firmly believe that he had the "stuff" to be a tsar.  He lacked the training.  He did not know how to do the job, but he would have done it far more effectively.

I do not understand why Stolypin was assassinated.  It seems to me a lot of what happened, if not ALL of it, would have been avoided if he had lived.