Realistically, was escape possible?

Apparently,  the Germans had the impression from other paydays that it was not unusual for many the guards to spend their wages drinking that day and / or night.  And this was one of the reasons they had chosen this day or as close to it as the time they would make their rescue.

I'm not sure who or even if the archives in Germany have been searched in regards of this paticular rescue plot.

It would be interesting to know how they had planned to go about the rescue.

AGRBear

Tania, the best way I can do this, is to send you the link:

http://www.ekaterinburg.tv/map1.htm

That's the main site; follow the links in there for Cathedral on the Blood.

The map can be enlarged, if you wish.

Best,

Since I don't read Russian,  can you tell me what street it is on and maybe the symbol used for the Cath. of the Blood on this particular map.


Photographs are always nice to see and there are some good ones.

Thanks.

AGRBear

Hm.  Sure a snatch and grab job was possible with one or two of the grandduchesses (Alexei and Alexandra were sick and Nicholas would never agree to leave), but keeping the snatch a secret for more than an hour or so would have been impossible under the conditions of their imprisonment.  Once the snatch was found out, I suspect two scenarios could have taken place:

a) the remaining family would be executed on the spot
-or-
b) the remaining family would be tortured in some way for information and then shot.

Immediately after the discovery of the missing person(s) a massive man hunt would have been organized.  The likelihood of the escapers evading capture once the rest of Russia found out would probably have been slim.

Wait as late as possible so the Czechs are getting close.

Drive up to the house in a couple of lorries with half a dozen men and documentation, apparently signed by Beloborodov, saying the plans have changed and Moscow had insisted on the family being moved.  Agree to send one or more of the guard for Beloborodov and in the meantime suggest the other guards rouse the family.

Once the family are assembled overpower the guards put the family on one lorry and servants on another, then drive like hell.  No one is likely to stop a Red Army lorry at night.  have the telephone and telegraph wires cut so that pursuit is delayed.  Hide up outside the town and make contact with the Czechs then hop on a train to Omsk or Vladivostok.

Sounds nice and simple but a lot that could go wrong and, of course, pure fantasy.  BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

Interesting . . . and not beyond the realm of the possible.

But there are still major problems.

It probably would have taken considerably more than six rescuers to overpower the guards at the house.  The guards were neither as incompetent, as undisciplined, nor as chronically drunk as some have liked to imagine.

The commandant had a telephone in his office and could have telephoned Beloborodev.  No need to send someone.  Also, there are at least some indications that the Ural Soviet was not responding to Moscow's orders, right from first seizing custody of the family up through their execution.  So a purported order, signalling a sudden tutelage to Moscow and coming by an unrecognized messenger, might have sounded the alarm instead of created a diversion.  Remember, the commandant at the Ipatiev House was used to personal dealings with the leadership of the Ural Soviet.  He would have been highly suspicious of an order signalling a significant shift in policy being delivered in the manner proposed.

And the timing would have been very difficult to figure out by an outsider.  Just how close should be White Army be?  And how soon would the Ural Soviet take their own actions in response to the army's approach?

Actually, I think the best means of effecting a rescue would be to attack where least expected.  Assault the Ural Soviet while in session and hold them hostage for the release of the family.  The rescuers could have used all force necessary, as they would not have been hindered by concerns of inadvertently wounding members of the Imperial Family in an assault on the Ipatiev house.

Or take it a step further.  Seize the families of the key members of the Soviet and hold them hostage for release of the Romanovs.  The families would probably be even less guarded than a session of the Soviet.

Let's face it.  Not too many people really wanted to put themselves at risk to rescue the Romanovs.  Such was the legacy of Nicholas' sorry reign.  Even within the leadership of the White Army, the goal was more to reverse the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks than to return the Romanovs to power.  

Wait as late as possible so the Czechs are getting close.

Drive up to the house in a couple of lorries with half a dozen men and documentation, apparently signed by Beloborodov, saying the plans have changed and Moscow had insisted on the family being moved.  Agree to send one or more of the guard for Beloborodov and in the meantime suggest the other guards rouse the family.

Once the family are assembled overpower the guards put the family on one lorry and servants on another, then drive like hell.  No one is likely to stop a Red Army lorry at night.  have the telephone and telegraph wires cut so that pursuit is delayed.  Hide up outside the town and make contact with the Czechs then hop on a train to Omsk or Vladivostok.

Sounds nice and simple but a lot that could go wrong and, of course, pure fantasy.  BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

You're right, nothing's impossible.  This plan is plausible except for three points.  As Tsarfan brought up the men of the House were unlikely to obey any order from Moscow and would probably have viewed any such order with suspicion.  Assembling the family AND the servants would have taken a dangerously long time.  Alexandra and Nicholas would, I think have presented the biggest problem because they would have wanted to gather diaries and important documents and even retrieve things from the locked shed.  More than three people being taken from the house would have been logistically difficult if not impossible.  Finally, while I understand waiting until the Checks and the Whites get close so they would be nearer for help, this would have made the House guards even more nervous and suspicious - they would have been expecting something to go down and would probably have reacted violently if they even thought an escape was being planned.

Now, I think your plan would work if it had been enacted a week or so after the arrival of the IF to the House when things were in sort of a lull and the threat from opposing forces hadn't been great.  And if they limited the number of people escaping.  Frankly, forget about the servants (with the possible exception of Botkin), Alexei (too sick and unlikely to live long anyways), Alexandra (sick and merely a burden) and Nicholas (who would not have wanted to leave Russia, but would have been all right with a plan to save his daughters).  Then count out at least one daughter, probably Olga, who would have wanted to stay with her family and in the country she loved so dearly.  Then you could also possibly count out Tatiana because of her dogged loyalty to her mother.  That leaves you with Marie and Anastasia, the two youngest and the most likely to be able to withstand a dash for freedom and the pain of readjustment.

\

Let's face it.  Not too many people really wanted to put themselves at risk to rescue the Romanovs.  Such was the legacy of Nicholas' sorry reign.  Even within the leadership of the White Army, the goal was more to reverse the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks than to return the Romanovs to power.  

Exactly (and I've said as much in another thread on the tsarevitch). Very few, relatively speaking, thought highly enough of the Romanovs to put their lives at risk. Nicholas had lead the country into two disastrous wars, killing millions of his country men (and sadly the "cream of the crop" was the first to go). He had waffled on granting even a modicum of democracy to the people as demonstrated by the deceitful manner in which he dealt with the duma. For people living in utter squalor, knowing that the Romanovs were off cruising the Baltic or taking their sun in the Crimea must have seemed a dreadful injustice. I have to admit... there is very little about the Romanov clan that I find admirable. It is no mystery why a revolution came about. Granted, Bolshevism was the last thing the country needed, but certainly ridding themselves of this ineffectual (to be as kind as possible) tsar, was a good thing. For me, the tragedy is that the provisional government was not able to maintain its power. And of course, it's tragic that the children were massacred in such a bloody manner.

The IF's best chance to escape was in the fall and early winter of 1917 while they were still in Tobolsk and the Bolshevik regime had not yet penetrated into Siberia. The prison regime was not very strict (there were no guards inside the house, as far as I know), the commandant Kobylinsky and his guard detachment were friendly, and so was most of the local population. The family still had easy access to their jewels and could have used them to bribe their way out of captivity and into freedom. Also important, Alexei had not yet suffered the injury that would leave him crippled for the rest of his life. All in all, the family would never again have such a golden opportunity to escape.

The IF's best chance to escape was in the fall and early winter of 1917 while they were still in Tobolsk and the Bolshevik regime had not yet penetrated into Siberia. The prison regime was not very strict (there were no guards inside the house, as far as I know), the commandant Kobylinsky and his guard detachment were friendly, and so was most of the local population. The family still had easy access to their jewels and could have used them to bribe their way out of captivity and into freedom. Also important, Alexei had not yet suffered the injury that would leave him crippled for the rest of his life. All in all, the family would never again have such a golden opportunity to escape.

Very true.  I can't quite remember, did any of the IF consider bribing the guards or escaping?

The IF's best chance to escape was in the fall and early winter of 1917 while they were still in Tobolsk and the Bolshevik regime had not yet penetrated into Siberia.

Very well-reasoned.

Actually, there are two questions implied in the creation of this thread, and perhaps they should be discussed separately:  escape vs. rescue.

I think rescue is problematic for a very simple reason.  No one with the means was really interested in rescuing the Romanovs.  The family members that fled Russia were more interested in finding a sanctuary for themselves than in putting unwelcome demands for assistance to foreign governments.  The White Army had rescue as a peripheral goal, if even that.  The wealthy industrial and commercial interests were more interested in seeking accommodation with any new regime than in signalling support for the order that had been washed away.

In the absence of a will to rescue, why worry about the means?

And Nicholas must have at least suspected this lack of interest in rescuing him and his family.  He had, after all, abdicated on the heels of a complete collapse of support from his extended family, his ministers, and his generals.  And the peasants, those stalwart defenders of God and Tsar, were no-shows except for a few friendly nods and baskets of eggs.

So, if anything were to be done, it must be escape.  But how could he risk attempting an escape with a family to worry about -- especially a family with a semi-invalid mother and son.

But Nicholas' worst enemy in the context of escape was probably that fatalism that had so blighted his reign.  The notion that everything was God's will was a paralytic agent in everything he did.  And so it would have been in even considering something as risky as an escape attempt.

No.  Neither escape nor rescue was possible -- and for reasons that were not physical or tactical.  Those would have been far easier to overcome.

I don't particularly admire one sentence responses, but really... I can't think of anything worthwhile to add to this encapsulation of events. Tsarfan... have you ever considered writing as a career?  

I have a slight problem with the notion that "NO ONE WITH THE MEANS WAS ACTUALLY INTERESTED IN RESCUING THE ROMANOVS" .  Sorry but this just isn't the case.

A fairly recently released Foreign Office file at the National Archives refers to a British rescue plan in 1917.  Whether this is the same plan as put together by Oliver Locker-Lampson and his RNAS armoured car unit or is connected with the "Tsar's House" at Murmansk I don't know, but the British appear to have had the will and means.  There were British agents in and around Ekaterinberg at the time of the murder (Digby-Jones was one and there were others) though probably working more on Czech liaison than on rescuing the Family.

Whatever, you can't flat out state that no-one with the means was interested.

Phil Tomaselli

But Nicholas' worst enemy in the context of escape was probably that fatalism that had so blighted his reign.  The notion that everything was God's will was a paralytic agent in everything he did.  And so it would have been in even considering something as risky as an escape attempt.

Exactly!  I am of the mind set that yes, there could have been a rescue or an escape if they had worked hard enough.  Nicholas and not the Bolsheviks was what doomed them.

I have a slight problem with the notion that "NO ONE WITH THE MEANS WAS ACTUALLY INTERESTED IN RESCUING THE ROMANOVS" .  Sorry but this just isn't the case.

A fairly recently released Foreign Office file at the National Archives refers to a British rescue plan in 1917.  Whether this is the same plan as put together by Oliver Locker-Lampson and his RNAS armoured car unit or is connected with the "Tsar's House" at Murmansk I don't know, but the British appear to have had the will and means.  There were British agents in and around Ekaterinberg at the time of the murder (Digby-Jones was one and there were others) though probably working more on Czech liaison than on rescuing the Family.

Whatever, you can't flat out state that no-one with the means was interested.

Phil Tomaselli

Most rescue plots were fantasies, many more were simply bunk with no logistical hope.  The Romanovs were perceived as a threat to English peace because of the associations they carried with them and the British government's fear of provoking the wrath of the new Russian power.  

There were British agents in and around Ekaterinberg at the time of the murder (Digby-Jones was one and there were others) though probably working more on Czech liaison than on rescuing the Family.

Whatever, you can't flat out state that no-one with the means was interested.

Thanks for pointing this out.  I remember having read about this at some point, but it had not been filed into my memory as a serious rescue attempt.  Maybe I was wrong in that conclusion.

The real question, then, is whether they were there to rescue the Romanovs or, as you say, more to manage liaison with the Czechs.

Although the White Army was bearing down on Ekaterinburg, my understanding is that it had more to do with the Ural capital as an industrial center of strategic significance than with the Romanovs' presence.  Indeed, I wonder if having some live Romanovs delivered up to them might not have caused consternation among at least those elements of the White command who had personal aspirations which would be inconvenienced by a return of the Romanovs.  (The Whites were an assemblage of counter-revolutionary factions among whom pro-monarchists were not dominant.)

If the British were serious about rescuing the Romanovs and had the means to do so, why didn't they?  Certainly they must have known that the advance of the Czech forces would send the captors into a panic during which the family's fate would become very precarious.  And as Elisabeth pointed out, there were times earlier in the captivity where the prospects were more favorable.  No attempts were made then.  Why not?

England had not been willing to accept the family when it would have meant little more than meeting them at the dock.  Why would they have later become willing to risk British lives and unforeseen diplomatic snares with a rescue attempt?