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Imperial Russian History / The End of Peter the Great's Road?
« on: July 24, 2013, 10:09:05 AM »
The Russian government and the Orthodox Church have recently joined in a series of anti-gay legislation that smacks almost of fundamental Islam in its severity and that has left western observers scratching their heads about what is going on. To give an idea of the stridency of these measures, the adoption of Russian children even by heterosexual couples in countries that have legalized gay marriage has been banned. Another new law allows the police to arrest and hold foreigners for up to two weeks who are "suspected" of being gay or "pro-gay". This is raising concerns about the safety of athletes competing in the upcoming Olympic games in Sochi and spawning talk of boycotting the games.
A recent editorial by a European man living in Dubai commented on the conviction there of a Norwegian woman who had been sentenced to 16 months in jail for reporting a rape by a male colleague. The writer reminded westerners that our assumptions about the universality of correct principles of law, human rights, due process, and government reach are simply wrong. People in eastern cultures might flock to MacDonald's, might wear blue jeans, might drive Mercedes' and BMWs and Buicks, might listen to western music and line up for western action movies. But the notion that, in the process, they are becoming more like us in the west is an illusion.
All this brings back into focus for me a question that I have pondered on and off for the past several years, particularly as I have watched the "managed democracy" of Putin take root and his courtship with Russia's autocratic legacy find its legs.
Is Russia reverting to its Asiatic roots? Is she coming to the end of the road paved by Peter the Great three centuries ago as he forcibly turned the eyes of Russia's social and political elite westward?
I'd like to start with two quotes (one I recently posted on another thread):
From General A. E. Tsimmerman, a frequent commentator on Russian society during the reign of Nicholas I:
"Generally we in Russia are normally much closer to Constantinople and Tehran than to Paris or London. The very understanding of the Russian people about good and evil, about right, about law, and justice, comes closest to that of the eastern peoples. In government, the people respect and particularly want to see strentgh. Our common people love to see in their ruler a powerful and stern sovereign."
And from Count Reiset, a member of the French embassy to St. Petersburg in the mid-19th century, to a Russian friend in Paris:
"I am resolved to direct all of my efforts towards a struggle against your influence [in European affairs] and to drive you back into Asia whence you came. You are not a European power; you ought not to be, and you will not be if France remembers that part which she should play in Europe. Our government knows very well your weak points and they are precisely the ones by which you are tied to Europe; let those ties be weakened and, of your own accord, you will flow back towards the East and you will become once again an Asiatic Power."
The reference to "weak points" was to the fact that Russia's Great Power status at that time rested only on the size and perceived strength of her army (something which was soon to be revealed as a chimera by the Crimean War). In terms of law, civil rights, social organization, and manufacturing economy Russia was a backwater from a European point of view.
And that same charge could be and was leveled against the Soviet Union in the Cold War era a century later -- a perceived military colossus manned by millions with no rights to those things that, to westerners at least, define life in an advanced civil society.
Then, for a brief moment in the late 1980's as Glasnost and Perestroika seemed to bloom into hopes of fully-fledged democracy, many westerners thought that Peter the Great's long, torturous road had finally led Russia into the full light of western modernity.
We know by now that those hopes were forelorn. Within a few years, Russia had descended in a chaos of corruption and crony oligarchy under an alcoholic president, Boris Yeltsin. And from the collapse of that rickety house emerged an obscure KGB agent to whom power was handed in return for his promise not to pursue Yeltsin and his cronies for their sordid stewardship of Russia's affairs.
And today we have the "managed democracy" of Vladimir Putin and an era of rigged elections, political murders, press muzzling . . . and youth camps fostering worship of the demigod Putin, accompanied by large doses of xenophobic anti-western propaganda.
Has Peter the Great's road ultimately been nothing more than the longest detour to the biggest dead end in Russia's history?
A recent editorial by a European man living in Dubai commented on the conviction there of a Norwegian woman who had been sentenced to 16 months in jail for reporting a rape by a male colleague. The writer reminded westerners that our assumptions about the universality of correct principles of law, human rights, due process, and government reach are simply wrong. People in eastern cultures might flock to MacDonald's, might wear blue jeans, might drive Mercedes' and BMWs and Buicks, might listen to western music and line up for western action movies. But the notion that, in the process, they are becoming more like us in the west is an illusion.
All this brings back into focus for me a question that I have pondered on and off for the past several years, particularly as I have watched the "managed democracy" of Putin take root and his courtship with Russia's autocratic legacy find its legs.
Is Russia reverting to its Asiatic roots? Is she coming to the end of the road paved by Peter the Great three centuries ago as he forcibly turned the eyes of Russia's social and political elite westward?
I'd like to start with two quotes (one I recently posted on another thread):
From General A. E. Tsimmerman, a frequent commentator on Russian society during the reign of Nicholas I:
"Generally we in Russia are normally much closer to Constantinople and Tehran than to Paris or London. The very understanding of the Russian people about good and evil, about right, about law, and justice, comes closest to that of the eastern peoples. In government, the people respect and particularly want to see strentgh. Our common people love to see in their ruler a powerful and stern sovereign."
And from Count Reiset, a member of the French embassy to St. Petersburg in the mid-19th century, to a Russian friend in Paris:
"I am resolved to direct all of my efforts towards a struggle against your influence [in European affairs] and to drive you back into Asia whence you came. You are not a European power; you ought not to be, and you will not be if France remembers that part which she should play in Europe. Our government knows very well your weak points and they are precisely the ones by which you are tied to Europe; let those ties be weakened and, of your own accord, you will flow back towards the East and you will become once again an Asiatic Power."
The reference to "weak points" was to the fact that Russia's Great Power status at that time rested only on the size and perceived strength of her army (something which was soon to be revealed as a chimera by the Crimean War). In terms of law, civil rights, social organization, and manufacturing economy Russia was a backwater from a European point of view.
And that same charge could be and was leveled against the Soviet Union in the Cold War era a century later -- a perceived military colossus manned by millions with no rights to those things that, to westerners at least, define life in an advanced civil society.
Then, for a brief moment in the late 1980's as Glasnost and Perestroika seemed to bloom into hopes of fully-fledged democracy, many westerners thought that Peter the Great's long, torturous road had finally led Russia into the full light of western modernity.
We know by now that those hopes were forelorn. Within a few years, Russia had descended in a chaos of corruption and crony oligarchy under an alcoholic president, Boris Yeltsin. And from the collapse of that rickety house emerged an obscure KGB agent to whom power was handed in return for his promise not to pursue Yeltsin and his cronies for their sordid stewardship of Russia's affairs.
And today we have the "managed democracy" of Vladimir Putin and an era of rigged elections, political murders, press muzzling . . . and youth camps fostering worship of the demigod Putin, accompanied by large doses of xenophobic anti-western propaganda.
Has Peter the Great's road ultimately been nothing more than the longest detour to the biggest dead end in Russia's history?