The police inaction was explained as I wrote earlier. The lower level "on the street" police were sympathetic to the pogrom and the man in charge was dismissed with Nicholas' permission for his mis handling of the events:
"Plehve secured the tsar's agreement to dismiss von Raaben because of his poor handling of the disturbances. He sent his director of police, A.A. Lopukhin to Kishniev to investigate the conduct of the local authorities at the time of the pogroms. Lopukhin did not discover any trace of premeditated preparation of the pogrom, but he concluded that the events could not have taken place without the participation of the lower police ranks."
I have no information on what was going on down in the lower police ranks, but it certainly would not surprise me to find a lot of sympathy with the rioters.
But I think there are some questions that present themselves from what is known about the situation. For starters, I think Lopukhin's investigating the situation is somewhat akin to the Bush administration's investigating the Valerie Plame leak. The findings cannot be dismissed out of hand, but neither they should they be accepted uncritically.
But I have more substantive questions about the events. My understanding is that the police were not called into action until 6:00 p.m. on April 7. They then quelled the unrest in the main city within two hours. This does not sound like the accomplishment of a police force that was not under control. So, what converted them from an unreliable force on Sunday afternoon into a crackjack team on Monday evening?
Also, if the police were found on Sunday to be unreliable, why was the army garrison not called into service? If von Raaben could not be found -- and reports were that he could not be -- then why wasn't St. Petersburg telephoned or telegraphed for authority to call up the army?
I think there is another possible explanation of these events . . . and one that provides some connective tissue to the widely disparate report of events that came later. The central government was willing to let the pogrom go just far enough to send a signal to the Jews but then wanted to intervene soon enough to maintain "credible deniability" with the international community.
This would explain the authorities' taking no action in the face of building rumors and reports in the days leading up to Easter 1903. It would explain a police force absent on Day One suddenly becoming highly effective on Day Two. It would explain an army garrison inexplicably left in its barracks. It would explain an ambiguous message from Plehve to von Raaben in the weeks before the pogrom. It would explain a tsar later thanking the publisher of a highly-incendiary newspaper. It would explain Witte's later comments. It would explain the removal of only one senior person (the scapegoat von Raaben) in a widespread litany of mayhem.
Speculation, I admit. But the official story just doesn't ring true.
Nicholas' views of the Jews has always been a cypher to me. I have read Spiridovitch's comments before, and I was aware of various Jews in his regiments and even his household (such as Max Factor, who did the photography make-up for Alexandra and her daughters). I do not doubt the veracity of these reports.
However, for every one of these stories, there is an opposite. For instance, he denied a Yalta residency permit to a Jewish widow, saying there were already "enough yids" in Yalta. He denied Max Factor permission to marry, thereby precipitating Factor's emigration to the U.S. (and his founding of the cosmetics industry there). He made viciously anti-semitic comments to his mother after seeing a provocative play about the Jew's role in the crucifixion.
Either Nicholas did not know his own mind on this topic, or he echoed the sentiments he thought were shared by the people he was addressing, or he was personally highly ambivalent about Jews . . . or all of the above.
What is suspected with some good reason is that, toward the end of his reign, Nicholas might have been toying with signficant liberalization of Jewish policy, against the strenuous objections of senior Romanovs. But even then, there are questions as to how much of the thinking was his own or Alexandra's.
Usually I end up concluding that Russia -- and the Orthodox Church -- were profoundly anti-semitic and that Nicholas, as usual, could either not determine and communicate his own will categorically or could not exert it over his empire.