People v. Nicholas II Alexandrovich (COUNT 1)

[Forum Admin]

Memorandum in Response to Prosecution's Requests:

Mr. Prosecutor,

The charge was written with US criminal law definitions in mind for a specific reason.  Murder in the 1st degree encompasses lesser degrees of murder and thus permits the jury to find a lesser included offense if they so desire, such as voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter.

The Prosecution is free to use whatever sections of the act you believe applicable.  The burden of proof is on you to demonstrate why it applies.

Russian law is not controlling in this case. However, I will permit the introduction of Imperial Russian Law in the matter for the limited purpose of demonstrating intent ( or lack thereof) and the state of mind of the Defendant, as I believe it may be salient to those issues.

It is proper to "suggest" that the Defendant was not head of the Armed Forces. They have the burden of proof for that statement. You are free to introduce rebuttal evidence to challenge their statement.

The Defense has the burden of proof of their other statements as well and you are free to rebut.

Unless Defense has objections, we shall stand in recess until further notice from the Prosecution.

[Belochka]

Your Honor,

The Defense Team has no objection to recess until mid July.

Thank you for your consideration,

Margarita

(First Counsel for the Defense)

[Richard_Cullen]

Acting Presiding Judge, Counsel for the Defence.

I have previously asserted that the defendant was the defacto head of the Russian Armed Forces (Army and Navy) and as such they were under his 'direct' command.  Whether he chose to directly exercise this power or not is immaterial on a day to day basis however as the Supreme Autocrat he had power, in a non constitutional monarchy, to direct all organs of Government and to appoint and discharge Ministers as he saw fit.

I would refer you to more recent history with the following:

Eric Osterberg prosecutor Serb war trials: ‘It would be justified to say that the higher up the chain of command we go, the higher the degree of responsibility for the atrocities, which were ultimately executed by the common soldier on the ground’  This logic explains why the international court opened a special hearing against Karadzic and Mladic in 1996 and charged them with genocide, crimes against humanity, and the massacres in Srebrenica.

A defence that a president/dictator/absolute monarch of a country could not be found guilty of crimes against humanity on the basis that he or she was 'too far removed from the chain of command' is clealry unsustainable and would result in it being impossible to prosecute such a person.

The defendant's control of the army through his relatives was absolute and although he only 'directly' took command of the Army on the Esatern front in 1915 does not infer he was not for all intents and purposes the 'Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces' on Bloody Sunday.  the President of the USA is the Commander in Chief of the US Armed Forces as Queen Elizabeth II in the UK.

The Tsar could use the army as he saw fit.  In fact his control of the police, militia and armed forces is to be found in the October Manifesto (The words WE and OUR and the royal we and our and mean Nicholas Alexandrovich)

Manifesto of October 17, 1905
We, Nicholas II, By the Grace of God Emperor and Autocrat of all Russia, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc., proclaim to all Our loyal subjects:
Rioting and disturbances in the capitals [i.e. St. Petersburg and the old capital, Moscow] and in many localities of Our Empire fill Our heart with great and heavy grief.  The well-being of the Russian Sovereign is inseparable from the well-being of the nation, and the nation's sorrow is his sorrow.  The disturbances that have taken place may cause grave tension in the nation and may threaten the integrity and unity of Our state.  
By the great vow of service as tsar We are obliged to use every resource of wisdom and of Our authority to bring a speedy end to unrest that is dangerous to Our state.  We have ordered the responsible authorities to take measures to terminate direct manifestations of disorder, lawlessness, and violence and to protect peaceful people who quietly seek to fulfill their duties.  To carry out successfully the general measures that we have conceived to restore peace to the life of the state, We believe that it is essential to coordinate activities at the highest level of government.  
We require the government dutifully to execute our unshakeable will:
(1.) To grant to the population the essential foundations of civil freedom, based on the principles of genuine inviolability of the person, freedom of conscience, speech, assembly and association.  
(2.) Without postponing the scheduled elections to the State Duma, to admit to participation in the duma (insofar as possible in the short time that remains before it is scheduled to convene) of all those classes of the population that now are completely deprived of voting rights; and to leave the further development of a general statute on elections to the future legislative order.  
(3.) To establish as an unbreakable rule that no law shall take effect without confirmation by the State Duma and that the elected representatives of the people shall be guaranteed the opportunity to participate in the supervision of the legality of the actions of Our appointed officials.  
We summon all loyal sons of Russia to remember their duties toward their country, to assist in terminating the unprecedented unrest now prevailing, and together with Us to make every effort to restore peace and tranquility to Our native land.  
Given at Peterhof the 17th of October in the 1905th year of Our Lord and of Our reign the eleventh.

Nicholas

So here we have Nicholas 'ordering the responsible authorities' - army, militia, police to quell disorder.

This is my first arm of argument on the specific issue of the Tsar's accountability.  I look forward to the Defence team's response.  We must all recall we are dealing with the law as it exists now, now on the basis of the defendant's immunities under Imperial Law.  2005 law not the law of 1905.


Richard

[Belochka]

In the Matter of: PEOPLE vs. NICHOLAS  AlEXANDROVICH

If it pleases the Court,

The Prosecution has submitted their claim that the DEFENDANT Nikolai (Nicholas) Alexandrovich was referred to as the Commander in Chief (CiC) of the armed forces on Bloody Sunday. For the purpose of this exercise the use of an American Military Command structure is inappropriate in the Russian Imperial scenario.

We are faced with the definitions as they pertained to Imperial Russia in 1905. The term komandir was used to identify the numerous spheres of command within Russia whether they were the commanding officers of the Police Department, the Gendarmerie or designated high-ranking personnel within the military forces.

The Defense would like to point out that the Prosecution’s use of the term “Commander in Chief” in the Russian sense does not fall under the ambit of Section 5 (4) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Act 2000, c 24. This section states that a Military Commander is defined under the terms of this Act as:

“… a person effectively acting as a military commander” AND,
is a person who “commands … with a degree of control of authority[/u].”

By Imperial Decree, the first arm of the Emergency Statute of August 1881 (Polozhenie ob Okhrane) [Lauchlan, Russian Hide and Seek” p 66-67] the Cherezvychainaya Okhrana (Extraordinary Security) Law provided that Martial Law could be declared when Russian sovereignty was threatened. Only the Emperor with his cabinet could approve Martial Law, which necessitated the appointment of a Superior Commander (Pipes, “Russia under the Old Regime” p 306).  

The second arm of this emergency measure Usilennaya Okhrana (Re-enforced Security) enables the Governor-General with concurrence of the Minister of Internal Affairs, to arbitrarily declare emergency security measures without Imperial decree [Ascher, "The Revolution of 1905", Vol I, p 110, Pipes, pp 305-7].

The Commander of the St. Petersburg Military District, Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich, who was also the Emperor’s uncle, was nominally to be in charge of the military forces on Sunday (Harcave, “The Russian Revolution of 1905”, p 209). The Grand Duke appointed General Prince Vasil’chikov – the Commander of the Guard Corps, to act on his behalf, and to provide a dominant role in the military operation. As senior Commander General Prince Vasil’chikov’s own orders flowed down to the middle level operational commanders on the field stationed around the city perimeter and in the Winter Palace Square (Sablinsky, p 210).

If we apply the two elements of the modern legal definition of Military Commander from the Crimes Against Humanity and War Act, we can identify that there was only ONE

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[Belochka]

person who held that effective position of Military Commander, and who was able to direct command and control of all units on Sunday 9 January 1905.

Accountability may be defined as answering for the result of one's actions or omissions. In this case accountability was represented by a hierarchy of individual commanders who took decisions within their linked functional formations and units.

It is vital to appreciate that the notion of command, discipline, and leadership are the very essence of the military system. At the head of that system stands the commander, the officer from whom all authority radiates. Traditionally, “command” is defined as the legal authority to issue orders and to compel obedience. The obedience of subordinates is a vital component of command. Ideally command must be clear in law, organization and execution. However, being a concept devised by humans, it is subject to human frailty.    

What we have is a clearly defined linkage system militarily referred to as the chain-of-command. In this case, that chain-of-command started with the Grand Duke Vladimir and flowed downwards to General Prince Vasil’chikov, who was empowered with the authority to make effective decisions on behalf of his operational superior. All his decisions had to be a product of his personal critical analysis of the circumstances in which the decisions would be made in accordance to military custom. It was his duty to command and direct subordinate unit officers who were compelled to obey orders and give effect to those orders, and not to prejudice the orders given down the line of authority. Decisions remained with General Prince Vasil’chikov was the man responsible for the military while Martial Law was in place.  Ultimately his actions depended on his courage to make that decision and his integrity in taking responsibility for that decision.

Failure to quell revolutionary fervor necessitated that the Emperor place St. Petersburg under Martial Law, in order to preserve the prestige of the Crown and the nation. Its implementation for the purpose of gaining control was the Emperor’s right as Head of State (Harcave, p 118).  

In 1905, in Imperial Russia there was no other effective mechanism in the struggle against revolutionary insurrection, except the Emergency Statute, which was signed into law by Alexander III after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 (Pipes p 305).

Taking an administrative approach, there was a clear delegation of responsibility to carry out whatever measures were considered necessary to maintain order in the capital city.

Now let us look at the course of events as they unfolded which will illustrate who was accountable for the events of Sunday, 9 January.

On Friday, 7 January 1905, an Imperial Decree placed St. Petersburg under the military authority of the Guard Corps Commander General Prince Vasil’chikov (Sablinsky, “The Road to Bloody Sunday”, p 205). It was his duty to co-ordinate the plan of action against the impending illegal march of demonstrators who according to Okhrana intelligence, intended to transform the march into an armed uprising (Harcave, p 84). The use of

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military forces was co-ordinated with the assistance of the Minister of War (Sablinsky, p 206) General Victor Victorovich. Sakharov [Harclave, “Memoirs of Count Witte” p 384], one day later on Saturday.

As the Chief of Staff of the St. Petersburg Military District, it was the duty of General Meshetich to inform the St. Petersburg Governor, General Fullon that an Imperial Decree had been issued declaring Martial Law in the city.
[Ref: http://tradicia.soborspb.ru/histori/rus/3.htm ]

The city authorities met and agreed to divide the city into eight distinct military sectors, each under the authority of a military supervisor of mid-level rank (Major-General) paired with a senior ranking police officer (Sablinsky, p 205).

The next day, on Saturday, 8 January, the Minister of War, General Sakharov with the co-operation of the Minister of Interior, Prince P. D. Svyatopolk-Mirski, assigned the required troops. By nightfall, a meeting was called in the presence of the Governor of St. Petersburg, General Fullon, to discuss logistics for controlling the march on Sunday.

Not one person at that meeting considered that there was to be blood spilt on the stones the next day. Based on Okhrana surveillance reports the conferees: Prince P. D. Svyatopolk-Mirski, Minister of Justice - N. V. Muravyev, Minister of Finance - V. N. Kokovtsov, General Prince S. I. Vasil’chikov, General Meshetich, the Chief of Gendarmes - General K. N. Rydzevsky and the Director of Police General A. A. Lopukhin; [Ref: http://tradicia.soborspb.ru/histori/rus/3.htm ] all had recalled the Khodynskoe Field catastrophe, and believed that revolutionary agitation would not be permitted to develop.

Results of that conference were reported by the Minister of the Interior, General Prince P. Svyatopolk-Mirski and General Lopukhin, in the absence of military personnel. Both these individuals specifically traveled to Tsarskoe Selo later that evening to inform the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich that “everything was under control” in St. Petersburg and the safety of the Emperor was assured. [Ref:http://orthodox.etel.ru/2003/32/nikolaj.shtml]

The St. Petersburg authorities believed that the city administration in conjunction with the police and gendarmes had full control of the city without deploying the military forces. Believing their collective assurances, the Emperor exercised his Imperial Will and revoked the decree of Martial Law [Ref: http://orthodox.etel.ru/2003/32/nikolaj.shtml].
� 
Abraham Ascher (“Russia in Disarray” p 110) correctly noted that in the case of civil disturbances, the ultimate decision was placed at the full discretion of the authority in St. Petersburg, a power that was invested under the operation of the Emergency Statute of August 1881.

But Ladies and Gentlemen, who was that authority?

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[Belochka]

Despite the fact that the military authorization had been rescinded by the Emperor just hours before Sunday dawned, it is not for us here to explain why that intelligence was not transmitted down through the accepted military chain-of-command pathway to General Prince Vasil’chikov. For this Court it is only necessary to appreciate that it was the Emperor’s Will (intent) that only ministerial authorization was to be employed, guided under the shield of the second arm of the Emergency Statute of 1881 - Usilennaya Okhrana (Re-enforced Security).

Thus the DEFENSE can confirm that the Emperor trusted that the Governor of St. Petersburg together with the Minister on Internal Affairs would act by mutual consensus and not in concert with the military forces.

General Vasil’chikov, unaware of any change to his original orders met with lower ranking regimental officers to finalize logistics for Sunday (Sablinsky, p 209). With the dawning of Sunday, Vasil’chikov had still not been informed that Martial Law was no longer to be enforced. Therefore the military infrastructure maintained their key positions around the city on full alert. No dispersal of the military units had occurred, which is what the DEFENDANT expected to have occurred the previous evening.

In Tsarskoe Selo, the Emperor went about his duties on Sunday – traditionally the Orthodox day of resurrection; calmly believing that Martial Law was no longer in place and peace had finally enveloped his capital city.

Nikolai’s diary entry for January 8 clearly illustrates his peace of mind:

“The workers are so far behaving peacefully … Mirski came in the evening with a report on proposed measures.” [Dnevnik Imperatora Nikolaya II, (Russian Language) pp 208-9]  

It is patently obvious that Nikolai had NO intention of using military force against the Russian people on that Sunday.

Ladies and gentlemen, how could any reasonable person honestly believe that the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich could be held accountable under these set of peculiar circumstances – circumstances that were entirely beyond his direct control and knowledge?


_____________________________________________


Now let us turn to two precedents from history where fatal suppressions of civil disturbances led to no convictions of commanders on the ground, let alone the Head of State.

In 1970, in the United States, Kent State University experienced a vigorous civil disturbance on its campus. The Governor of Ohio sent in the National Guard to restore order. The guardsmen opened fire on a crowd of protesters, that resulted in loss of four lives and numerous wounded. All the victims died as a result of bullets being fired by the

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Ohio National Guard, within a 400 feet range, amidst the cloud of tear gas. The question arose as to who was accountable for that tragedy. Criminal trials in both Federal and State court were either dismissed or ended in acquittals. Governor Rhodes insisted that the demonstrators’ behavior, and not the Guardsmen, was responsible for the tragedy. [Ref: http://www.vw.cc.va.us/vwhansd/HIS122/KentState.html].

Many decades earlier in 1919, under the protection of Martial Law, fifty British troops under General Reginald Dyer’s command, deliberately opened fire on an unarmed crowd of 10,000 at Amritsar, India. This scene was dramatically depicted in the 1982 Lord Attenborough film “Gandhi.” General Dyer followed the orders of Sir Michael O' Dwyer, the Lt. Governor of Punjab, to stop any mass meetings. As a result of this command, 379 were killed, and 1,200 were left wounded inside the Sikh temple complex. Returning as a hero, senior British officers applauded General Dyer’s suppression of another Indian Mutiny. Despite the English Prime Minister’s protestations, the British Parliament cleared Dyer’s name following an inquiry, while The House of Lords passed a measure commending his ruthless action. [Ref: http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Amritsar_Massacre]

Following the International Law guidelines [Ref: http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/general/2005/command.htm] the modern doctrine of command responsibility can be defined as the responsibility of commanders for war crimes committed by subordinate members of their armed forces or other persons subject to their control.

Article 7(3) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) states that:

“ …the fact that the crimes were committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators.”

In other words, the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich did not possess information of this nature, which would have warned him of the risk of whether crimes were committed or were about to be committed by his subordinates.

The DEFENSE contends that there was no transference of criminal responsibility upwards to suggest that Nikolai Alexandrovich could be liable for acts to which had no actual knowledge, nor was there a perception of immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence, either by acts of commission or omission. Furthermore, the doctrine of “criminal responsibility” applies to a theater of war, which did not apply to St. Petersburg on Sunday 9 January, 1905.
 
Nikolai Alexandrovich cannot be held to account for the revolutionary uprising in St. Petersburg that cold Sunday afternoon. An event that moved as rapidly as any fire on the dry prairies.

_____________________________________________



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2. The DEFENSE completely rejects the Prosecution’s use of the Serbian War Trial on indictment by the ICTY in 1995; on the grounds that this particular case dealt with “crimes in time of war”.

The term “War Crime” originated from the 1907 Hague Convention preamble, which codified the customary law of armed conflict. It is timely here to remind the Court that it was the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich, who proposed that all nations come together and meet in order to cut down on their military forces and submit to general arbitration on international disputes. The Hague Peace Conference was convened on our DEFENDANT’S initiative in the Netherlands, on May 18, 1899, and served as the precedent for the later League of Nations and United Nations. [Ref: http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/hague.html]

The concept of “War crimes” is a recent notion. Prior to WWII the horrors of war were considered to be the nature of war. WWII revealed the mass murder or mistreatment of millions of civilians and prisoners of war in Germany and Japan. The allied powers were forced to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. These trials are the only precedents which The Hague hears. [Ref: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1420133.stm].

War crimes extend to genocide (the most severe category) and mass murder, whereby there are grave breaches of the Geneva Convention (1949) in relation to the protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Today, these crimes are embodied in Human Rights Law convening as from 2001, as the International Criminal Court based in The Hague, which is a permanent court authorized by the United Nations.

Significantly, to date, the only former Heads of State or Heads of Government that have been charged with war crimes are Karl Dönitz of Germany, ex prime minister Hideki Tojo of Japan and former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. [Ref: http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/War_crime]

In the first of many Hague Press Releases, the following, dated 8 July 1996, [Ref: http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p098-e.htm ] stated that:

Prosecutor Harmon had placed the two accused Radovan Karadzik (President of Republika Srpska) and Ratko Mladic (Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army) firmly in control of the Bosnian Serb forces. Harmon further asserted that:

"Dr. Karadzic had complete authority and control over all the official Bosnian Serb forces in time of war. He created a unified command for the Bosnian Serb Army and police. This meant that information about all aspects of the conflict flowed directly up and down the chain of command.”


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How that Chain of Command operated was illustrated by the following Hague Press Release (11 July, 1996): [Ref: http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p099-e.htm]

The Trial Chamber noted that Karadzic and Mladic exercised their power in order to plan, instigate the execution of the war crimes. Their offences were committed in accordance with a political program and military organization.

It found that:

"Radovan Karadzic’s central role in the political and military preparation of the take-over by the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. … His actions and statements demonstrate not only that he was abreast of his subordinate's doings, but also, notably, that he endorsed their behavior, that he participated … in the planning of the policy of ethnic cleansing … and that he himself was in a position to order the Bosnian Serbs' operations which led to the commission of prohibited acts.”

As Chief of Staff of the Bosnian Serb Army:

"Ratko Mladic had full control over his generals and …was often personally involved in the operational decisions of the various corps.”
 
Now that we have explained the nature of the Indictment against Karadzik and Mladic, it can be very clearly seen that the ICTY precedents are NOT relevant to the DEFENDANT.  

Unlike the war criminals Karadzic and Mladic, who gloated in the death of innocents, the DEFENDANT was so completely overwhelmed by the turn of events that Sunday he expressed the following harrowing entry in his diary during the evening of 9 January:

“A wretched day! In St. Petersburg there were serious disorders as a result of the desire of the workers to approach the Winter Palace. Troops were compelled to fire in different parts of the city; many were killed and wounded. God, how painful and wretched! ” [Dnevnik Imperatora Nikolaya II, (Russian Language) p 209] Translation and emphasis by Margarita Nelipa

It would be a deplorable travesty of justice to place the DEFENDANT into the same immoral category as the Yugoslav war criminals.

The DEFENDANT had no knowledge or involvement in what was transpiring on Sunday 9 January 1905.

The DEFENDANT had the reasonable expectation in believing that the Russian citizens would uphold the laws of the land peacefully.

None of the elements of a War Crime can be applied to the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich.


_____________________________________________



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3. The defense CHALLENGES the Prosecution’s introduction of the October Manifesto, 1905 on the grounds that the events of 9 January 1905 occurred well before the Manifesto was ever contemplated.

The Uprising did not alter the course of government policy in any way. Count Witte, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers stated in his February 12 interview:

 "…it was a passing phenomenon." (Ascher,Vol I, p 103).

Only after the conclusion of the war with Japan, was the October Manifesto offered to the people, under pressure of revolutionary turmoil and continuing civil disobedience and under the co-ordination of ministerial policy in spring of 1905 (Lieven, Nicholas II, “Twilight of the Empire,” p 148).

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To conclude this phase of the proceedings, the DEFENSE would like to remind you that the English King (George V) was never held to account for what transpired in India in 1919, nor was the U.S. President (Nixon) held to account for the events of Kent State University in 1970.

We are all aware that Nikolai Alexandrovich assumed the role of Supreme Military Commander of the military forces on 23 August 1915 (Mul’tatuli, P. “God Shall Bless My Decision” [in Russian] Part II, Ch 1) one year after the announcement of World War I, by dismissing Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich.

His Imperial WILL was formalized by Imperial Ukase submitted to the Senate and published in the journal “Niva”, # 36, 1915, p 681. (Mul’tatuli, Part III, Ch 2). The Ukase (translated by Margarita Nelipa), voiced the following:

"Ukase (to the) Governing Senate.

Have assumed for Myself (the) Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in the field, All Gracious duty (of) Our General-Adjutant, General of the Infantry His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich shall be vice regent (of) Our Caucasus (region), Commander-in-Chief (of) the Caucasian army and forces under (the) authority (of the) Caucasus ataman shall be enjoined with Our General-Adjutant." NIKOLAI

Accompanying the formal Imperial declaration, a Prikaz was issued simultaneously on the same day, 23 August, 1915 to the military forces [Spiridovich, “Great War and February Revolution 1914-17 (in Russian), Part I, Ch 12, p 159]. It declared (translation by Margarita Nelipa):

"Prikaz Army and Navy. 23 August 1915.

From this date I have assumed for myself command (of) all armed land and naval forces, within the operative theatre of war…." NIKOLAI

In Grand Duke Kirill’s own words, the “concentration of ALL command in one person.” (G.D. Kirill “My Life in Russia’s Service” p 201); now lay squarely in the Emperor’s own hands. Nikolai’s action necessitated that there was a complete change of the elite General command at Stavka (Headquarters). This decision was expressed in Nikolai’s telegram to the Tsaritsa transmitted on 23 August [Spridovich, p 159] (translated by Margarita Nelipa) which stated:

" … Meeting went extremely well and simply. He will depart day after tomorrow, but the change (in leadership) occurred today. Now everything is done…"
   
From that day, the Imperial forces became aware that it was their Emperor who became the Supreme Commander of the Military (Mul’tatuli, Part II, Ch 2).

Such a historically documented event contradicts the Prosecution’s erroneous presumption that the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich could have been a military commander in 1905.

Why then, Ladies and Gentlemen, must the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich who was the Head of his State, be considered to be the Supreme Commander of an event that occurred a decade before on Sunday, 9 January 1905?

The prosecutor has failed to convince that the definition of Military Commander applies to the DEFENDANT Nikolai Alexandrovich on January 9 1905.

Furthermore the Prosecution has failed to convince that the DEFENDANT was accountable for the uprising of January 9 1905.

The DEFENSE contends that the Prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against the DEFENDANT.


Margarita Nelipa - First Chair for the Defense

[Forum Admin]

The Court thanks the Defense. Prosecution may have one rebuttal if they so wish, to be followed by one follow-up response from the Defense, on this issue before moving forward.

FA
Acting Judge

[Richard_Cullen]

Your Honour Acting Judge, Counsel for the Defence

Soory i haven't had chance to get onto the site over the last week or so.  I will consider the defence's submission and then respond

Richard

[Belochka]

Welcome back Richard.