What Could Nicholas II Have Done to Preserve the Imperial Throne?

[edubs31]

One of the most sobering aspects of the years from 1917 to 1921 is how often the fledgling Bolshevik authorities found themselves not leading but trying to keep up with and then take credit for the upswell of murderous resentment that swept across Russia from peasants and urban workers.  In many ways, when it came to the revolution the Russian people were the tail wagging the Bolshevik dog.

The tsarist government was not brought down.  It collapsed.  There is a difference.

But if the people themselves were capable of such confused and ruthless behavior does it not also suggest that revolutionary takeover was inevitable? Maybe not in 1918, but coming soon...regardless of the catastrophic errors in judgement, coupled with some bad breaks, by the Tsar and leadership within the regime?

[Robert_Hall]

I agree with Tsarfan, regarding Nalipa's "objectivity" Her Rasputin was just a white wash, I expect AII  to much the apologia  as well. However, I will buy the book simply for the reason that I do not have any other book [reasonably contemporary] about him. If it is just another hagiography, well, better than nothing. I doubt she will blame AIII for the revolution though.

[Tsarfan]

But if the people themselves were capable of such confused and ruthless behavior does it not also suggest that revolutionary takeover was inevitable?

This is a hard question, and I waffle in my own view.

None of the anti-monarchist parties -- including the Bolsheviks -- were ready to take up the responsibilities of government in February 1917, and they all spent most of the summer of that year rebuffing pleas to step up and take control.  In fact, were it not for the remarkable focus on personal power that possessed Lenin, even the Bolsheviks would not have made their play in October.  Up to the coup that month, the mass of the workers in the big cities still wanted the Soviet (which was a very different entity at that point from the Bolsheviks) to take control.

So, even in the cities, I don't think a revolution was inevitable had the tsarist government been even marginally functional.  

And in the countryside I think the impetus toward revolution was even more diffuse.  In fact, when word of the revolution reached most rural villages, the peasants initially expressed surprise -- sometimes even regret -- until someone arrived to relieve the local tsarist officials of their duties.  It was only at that point, when the peasants felt the boot of suppression really had been lifted, that all hell broke loose across the rural stretches of Russia.  Exploiting a revolution and making one are two entirely different things.

In many ways, the peasants of 1917-18 behaved much as the peasants behaved a century and a half earlier during the Pugachev rebellion in those regions where Pugachev temporarily seized the upper hand from Catherine -- deeply resentful but submissive until someone else lifted the tsarist boot from their necks.

True revolutionaries free themselves from oppression.  They do not simply throw a wild orgy after one autocrat leaves the village by the south road and then submit to another autocrat who comes in by the north road.  And, sad as it is, that's pretty much what happened in the Russian Revolution.  

[Vanya Ivanova]

I think looking at the specifics of the 1905 Revolution are extremely helpful in relation to this debate. It illustrates the confluence of agrarian reform and industrialisation as being the main destabalising factors within Russia at the end of the 19th century. It also has the direct parallel with the unsuccessful Russo-Japanese war (vrs WWI) replete with military mutinies (Sevastopol,Kronstadt, Battleship Potemkin etc.

Therefore all the factors that came into play in 1917 were represented then, 1905 was a dress rehearsal for 1917 if you like and explains to me why the end, when it came, was so swift.

A large part of Alexander II's motivation in liberating the Serfs was to enable a free movement of labour essential to successful industrialisation. It was at this point that the creation of a real urban working class in Russia really came about. At the same time in the countryside the newly freed peasants were initially given some form of political representation at a local level in the form of the Zemstvos.

These were supposed to help sort out the multitude of new problems the emancipation had unleashed for both ex serf and landowner alike, redemtion Tax, sale of land etc.

Alexander III on his accession to the throne effectively removed the Zemstvos, and replaced them with the 'land captains'. This exacerbated all the problems for both ex serf and ex owners and led to an almost complete breakdown in local administration throughout the Empire. It also created enormous disaffection not just in the peasants and urban workers but the landowners aswell, all of whom were effectively made worse off by Alexander III's attempts to reverse the effects of the emancipation but not the act itself. A perfect example of just how much the mechanisms of state had been weakended is the chaos that ensued with the Cholera epidemic of 1891.

Therefore by 1905 there were several large but very diverse agitational components within Russian Society. Both the peasants and the new urban workers had been given citizenship but no actual freedoms whilst at the same time policies promoting industrial growth were being aggressively persued. This contradiction deprived Russia of the successful industrialization she sought and meant that Russia's landowning class were also materially worse off. It also meant that Russia was unable to compete militarily, the infra structure was simply not there. This in turn led to disaffection within the military aswell.

The post 1917 communist rulers of Russia have peddled the myth that it was one people with one agenda rising up to overthrow a tyrannical regime. It was not of course. It was many many diverse factions sometimes fighting for common goals sometimes not. It was the radicalised urban workers typified by Trotsky that took charge of Petrograd at the crucial moment because they happended to be in the right place at the right time. The Civil war further shows that the Bolsheviks did NOT speak for the majority of Russians. Between 1921 -1926 there could have been a move to some sort of genuine political reform but the appearance of Stalin ensured that did not happen.

Therefore in relation to Alexandra, all the diverse elements that led to the dynasty's downfall were very in much in place and on the move by 1905, Nicholas tried a liberal approach and then a hardline one in response, neither worked and not just because he was ideologically opposed to the liberal viewpoint. I apportion a large part of the blame directly to his father for this NOT because he was a reactionary but because he crippled effective local administration throughout the empire, which for me was the single deciding factor in why their was so much unrest by 1905 and a complete lack of the necessary infrastructure for Russia to compete militarily both in the Russo-Japanese and WWI.

Those are the reasons the dynasty collapsed. All that the arguments for Alexandra's influence have shown (in my personal opinion) is that she was unpopular because she happended to be a German at a time Russia happended to be fighting a war with Germany and was always personally unpopular with the Tsar's relatives. That however cannot be considered even a factor in the regimes collapse because it was entirely symptomatic, not in any way a causation of the failure to industrialise based on a fundamentally ideological conflict because Nicholas tried both broadly liberal and the hardline approaches, neither worked, because the damage had already been done in the previous reign and WWI just brought it all to a head.

[Petr]

True revolutionaries free themselves from oppression.  They do not simply throw a wild orgy after one autocrat leaves the village by the south road and then submit to another autocrat who comes in by the north road.  And, sad as it is, that's pretty much what happened in the Russian Revolution.  
[/quote]

Which, of course, raises the question of whether the Revolution was inevitable as has been suggested by some absent other contributing factors (e.g., WWI) .

Robert, I disagree with your characterization of Margarita's book on Rasputin's murder as a white wash. On the contrary, I think there was a pretty good indictment of members of the RF (GD NN in particular) and the reconstruction of actual events that took place pretty much dispells the conspiracy theory regarding the participation of the English Secret Service advanced in certain quarters (viz., the size of the bullet hole in the head as proof that it was created with a British Service revolver which was pretty much refuted due to the discrepancy in size as discussed elsewhere on this site).  I'm not clear on who exactly you believe she white washed. All I ask is that you keep an open mind when you read the book on AIII.

Petr   

[Petr]

I think looking at the specifics of the 1905 Revolution are extremely helpful in relation to this debate. It illustrates the confluence of agrarian reform and industrialisation as being the main destabalising factors within Russia at the end of the 19th century.

Dear Vanya:

I agree with you in large measure insofar as your analysis regarding the conflict created between Russia's rapid industrialization and changing conditions in rural Russia. There is a fair amount of sociological study of the psychological disruption caused by the conflict resulting from peasants living in rural agrarian societies who transition to an urban industrialized proletariat.  It must be remembered that the workers in plants would often go home to help with the harvests so they never really lost contact with their agrarian roots and never fully adjusted to the harsh late 19th century working conditions (which were not unique to Russia).  The issue of Land Captains vs. Zemstvos and its effect on the rural populace and the land owning gentry is, I think, something that bears further study. However, in my view the fact that Stolypin and Krivoshein tried to reintroduce the Zemstvos is probably a good argument for the proposition that AIII was in error (given my personal views on the merits of Stolypin). That said as I repeatedly say absent WWI I don't believe Russia would not have been able to weather the conflict between the urban industrialized masses and the rural peasants given enough time which it was denied.

By the way, based upon my family history, not all peasants rampaged in the countryside murdering the gentry.  While that certainly happened there were instances of quite the contrary where peasants defended landowners from outside agitators. Unsurprisingly, it depended in large measure on the relationship established between the landowner and the individuals living on and working the land.  The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many in the landed gentry were absentee landlords who did not take a personal interest in their holdings and the welfare of those living on their estates.  Also, it must be remembered that much of the turmoil created in the countryside was caused by individuals from the city imbued with revolutionary propaganda and just plain bandits.

Petr           

[Tsarfan]

. . . not all peasants rampaged in the countryside murdering the gentry.

No, not all did.  But the destruction of propertied interests was enormous.  For starters, on January 20, 1918 all Church property was confiscated by the state.  This was followed by widespread looting of monasteries and churches, with entire cloisters of monks being killed in some cases, such as happened at the Alexander Svirsky Monastery in Olonetsk.

In the first six months of 1918 alone -- with Bolshevik power not yet even consolidated -- 35,000 safe deposit boxes were opened by their owners under compulsion by local revolutionaries.  In addition, people with large houses were forced to take in government-assigned tenants.  Some of the wealthy tried to retain the largest rooms and best furnishings for themselves, only to find that their former doormen and maids had signed up to become the commissars responsible for enforcing the government edict and were going to have none of it.

There was wide regional variance in what percentage of noble manors were looted and burned, with the central agricultural regions where the culture of the commune was stronger than the western provinces suffering the worst blows -- with some districts seeing 30% of manors burned.  But even in the 1905-06 revolution, across Russia an aggregate of 15% of all manors had been burned.  Now, 15% might sound rather small.  But just think what the reaction would be in the U.S. today if some social disturbance had destroyed 15% of this entire nation's homes.  Compared to such an event, the Watts Riots of 1965 that so gripped this nation's attention and fueled its angst over social upheaval would look like a puff of matchstick smoke next to a nuclear bomb cloud.

[Petr]

Undoubtedly all true by 1918 but by then all had gone to hell in a handbasket. My Great Great Uncle was murdered in his house (Tarasova) in front of his wife and children by some drunken sailors from Kronstadt. 1918 also saw the collapse of the Provisional Government and the start of the Civil War and you had Makhno et. al. running riot in the countryside. I was thinking more of the earlier wave of unrest in the countryside in 1916-17. Also there were regional differences in the level of violence. By the way my Great Grandfather was one of those forced to open his bank safety deposit boxes (along with having his house and all his possessions confiscated) with a resulting enormous loss (a rather significant collection of jewelry (among other things) that could have been easily transported into exile). The irony was that he believed that governments could come and go but the banks would remain safe. Electing not to emigrate he died of starvation in Moscow in 1920.  A horrendous miscalculation that threw my family into penury for the next quarter century until the younger generations established themselves. Of course, an even greater miscalculation was that on the eve of the First World War he heeded the request of the Russian Government (as a devoted patriot) and liquidated his rather extensive European holdings in order to repatriate the proceeds to buy war bonds. Unfortunately, a rather common history shared in various degrees by Russian emigres of that period.


Petr 

[TimM]

The sad thing was that I don't think that those that started the revolution just wanted to replace the autocracy with something worse.  Unfortunately, Lenin and his band of thugs hijacked the revolution.   

Lenin had the same sway that Hitler did, getting a crowd worked up.  Of course, Lenin was much more subtle than Hitler was.  By the time his true intentions became clear, it was too late, he had most of the military on his side.  And then came Stalin, and when he got started, I'm sure a lot of people began to long for the days of Nicholas and Alexandra.

[Alixz]

I had some time today and so I went back to the venerable Massie to see what I could find about Alexandra and her possible interference in things that should not have concerned her.

I had a lot more, but somehow I lost it and I don't feel like typing the whole thing out again right now.

However here is something: Nicholas's strong feelings about the army were constantly stimulated from another, less noble source: The personal animosity of the Empress against Grand Duke Nicholas. Alexandra never liked the fiery, impetuous soldier who towered over he less colorful husband. She had never forgotten that it was his melodramatic threat to blow out his brains in the presence of the Tsar and Witte which had forced the signing of the 1905 Manifesto, creating the Duma.

The fall of the Grand Duke was a source of grim satisfaction to the Germans.

Within the mauve boudoir at Tsarskoe Selo, the change was hailed as a supreme personal triumph. When Nicholas left for Stavka, he carried with him a letter of ecstasy from Alexandra.

I have been trying to decipher the "ibids" in the source section but right now I am not having any luck.

[Alixz]

Here is a quote from a chapter called: The Fateful Deception:

But if Nicholas did not always gratify his wife's entreaties, he rarely confronted her with an overt refusal. This was especially true in any matter involving Rasputin. Toward the " starets" the Tsar's own attitude was one of tolerant respect tinged with an amiable skepticism.

Nevertheless, when the Empress threw herself at him verbally, pleading that he follow the advice of "the Man of God" Nicholas often bowed. He new very well how much she counted on the presence and prayers of Rasputin; he had seen with his own eyes what had happened at the bedside of Alexei and Anna. To comfort her, encourage her and appease her fears, he endorsed her suggestions and recommendations. This relationship was greatly accentuated once Nicholas had left for Headquarters. Then, having left the management of internal affairs in the Empress's hands, Nicholas regularly deferred to her suggestions in the appointment of ministers. And it was her choice of minister, proposed by Rasputin, beseechingly pressed on and unwisely endorsed by the absent Tsar, which lost the Tsar his throne.

[Robert_Hall]

Alixz, you and I share an opinion  about Alexandra. Namely, I do not like her either. BUT, having said that, I think Massie was a bit short sighted on blaming her and Rasputin for the fall of the dynasty. Sure, she was an influence, one way or the other, but she was not  the "reason" as far as I can tell. The discontent from all sides started way before she arrived.
And Petr,  I admit to not reading Nalipas  whole book, I was given just the last 2 chapters and even at that excerpts to read by a friend who emailed them to me.  From the bits I read, I thought it a white wash and I do not believe any British government was involved in any way.  That, of course is another topic off this thread, but a point, rich people could obtain any firearms they wanted, from anywhere. By this time, I feel the foreign  governments wanted the monarchy to survive and indeed wanted to be rid of Rasputin's influence,  but did not want the state itself to collapse.

[Alixz]

Robert - I was using the quote to show that Massie felt that Alexandra was an "influence" on Nicholas and probably more than some people here think.

There have been posters who still insist that Nicholas made up his own mind, and I believe in a lot of cases he did. But I also believe, as Massie says, that in the long run, Nicholas tended to rubber stamp her ministerial selections and that she did make decisions that looked like his but were, in fact, hers.

Another page in that chapter shows that Massie also felt that Rasputin's ideas were only a parroting of Alexandra's ideas. The quote says that Rasputin was too stupid to challenge his patroness, but I think it was meant to say - too smart. He knew better than to kill the "goose who laid the golden eggs" (or whatever the Russian equivalent is in fairy tales).

Actually not smart but "cunning".

And in the end, it was the ministers who could no longer accept the "carousel" of ministerial changes because they couldn't work effectively when the never knew who would fall and/or be changed from day to day. They also could not accept the absence of Nicholas from his capital and from his job of ruling the country and his leaving Alexandra, a rank amateur, in charge.

Even after the murder of Rasputin, actually especially after that, Alexandra became a one woman vendetta and began giving orders and arresting people when she had no authority to do so. We all know that.

And, as I said before, it wasn't just the Imperial family and a few well placed people in St Petersburg who got tired of the bad government. The common worker and the staving population of St Petersburg took action. The army and the navy mutinied. I don't know if they had direct knowledge of Alexandra being the power behind the Throne and the bad decisions she was making, but even if they did not, they would attribute the mistakes to Nicholas because he was supposed to be making the decisions and as long as he allowed Alexandra to do his work for him she was a factor in the fall of the dynasty.

Maybe not a big a factor as some would like to think and I do agree that a lot of what happened began with other reigns - maybe even as far back as Nicholas I, but definitely with Alexander II and Alexander III.

[Alixz]

Oh and the reference to Germany.

The fall of the Grand Duke was a source of grim satisfaction to the Germans. "The Grand Duke, " Ludendorff wrote later. "was really a great soldier and strategist."

In September 1915, soon after the change of command at Russian Headquarters, the German offensive began to lose impetus.

There were no further great German offensives in the East during the war. Assuming the losses of 1915 had broken the back of the Russian army, the German General Staff transferred its main effort back to the Western Front.

I don't usually quote Massie at all because there has been so much more released and written about since his book came out in the early 1970s. But I had to start somewhere and I didn't want this to feel like a thesis.  

Now the Germans had to try, to go back to the Eastern Front even abandoning the Fort of Verdun for while to fight the renewed Russian offensive. In July of 1916, the Germans briefly threw eighteen German divisions at the Russians as they tried to advance in the East. The cost to the Russian army in the 1916 campaign was 1,200,00 men.

So much for the Tsar Warrior role that Nicholas wanted so badly.

[mcdnab]

Have read some of the recent posts with interest though am steering clear of Archbishop's comments.

Few thoughts feel free to disagree

Without the outbreak of war in 1914 - I think it highly likely that Nicholas II could have preserved the status quo in Russia for some time but it would have been difficult if not impossible to preserve it over the long-term.
Whilst unrest and strikes had continued since 1905 the Emperor was still relatively unchallenged and secure, the economy was improving from what I have read and opposition to the autocracy was still divided and weak.
However there was little incentive in the Russian system for the educated or wealthy non aristocratic classes to support a regime that effectively excluded them from sharing power.
I have no doubt that over time ,with or without a war, opposition to the regime would continue to grow and the harder it was stamped on by the Emperor's government the stronger it would grow.
Nicholas was on the whole unwilling to embrace political change that altered his view of himself or his role as Emperor.
He was not someone who would innovate policy shifts in order to save his throne because he simply doubted the validity of other systems of rule.
I don't think Nicholas II was particularly weak nor do I think he was necessarily the hen-pecked victim of first his mother and then his wife.
However I do believe that his affection for his wife not only blinded him to her own faults but also allowed himself to become isolated from the rest of his family.
Both his and his wife's biggest problems were their increasing inability to face the reality of the situation they faced.

In wider terms the rest of his family appear to have in the years leading up to the February Revolution simply given up on both Nicholas and the throne.