I must admit the idea of Nicholas negotiating over his abdication and safe departure never really occurred to me. Mostly because it was so out of character, and practically and politically a non-starter. In many respects he never governed from a position of strength of character or confidence, even at the best of times. When confronted at Pskov by Russky (his chief -of-staff?) and the opinions of his Front commanders, he knew it was all over. After protecting his son's condition, he seems content to have let Michael assume the burden of rule.
I think General Ruzsky and Nicholas's other leading generals might very well have been taken aback by the speed and utter abjectness of the tsar's abdication, since after all NII had been defending his autocratic rights for over two decades, against a mounting storm of public criticism, at least from the urban elites (including the middle class). Remember, initially Nicholas made no conditions whatsoever, he merely abdicated in favor of his son Aleksei (March 1, 1917). It was only on the following morning, after consulting with his court physician, Fedorov, that he decided to make it a condition of his abdication that his son the tsarevich be passed over in the succession in favor of his brother, Mikhail Aleksandrovich. So Nicholas actually did make a condition on the terms of his abdication, moreover, it was technically a completely illegal condition, because under existing Russian law he had no right whatsoever to abdicate on behalf of Aleksei Nikolaevich.
But as for negotiating a safe departure from danger , or from Russia, he wasn't in any position to demand anything really. On March 1 he was Emperor but his government had fallen in Petrograd and he was a bystander, not in control of anything. Think this : what if he had said ,hell no !to a demand for his abdication. What then ? It seems likely he would have been forcibly compelled eventually. But in a game of chicken with his top commanders and the Provisional government, he wasn't going to win.
Also, to negotiate a departure deal, he needed a negotiating partner, that is, a party that could fulfill its part of the deal. It was soon apparent that the Prov. Gov. couldn't uphold its implied commitment to get the ex-Imperial family ( wholely or in the form of just the children) out of the country. Fate, in the form of a measles outbreak at Tsarskoe Selo , contributed.
But as I've pointed out, Nicholas did make a condition to his abdication (moreover, an illegal one). But that was it. Instead of negotiating with his captors (after all, he could have made things much more difficult for them), Nicholas took it completely on faith that the new government of Russia, which let's note had not even been formed yet on March 1/2 1917, would permit himself and his immediate family, including the heir, safe passage from revolutionary Russia to Great Britain or some other accommodating Western European country. This is so politically naive. Nicholas, with his oft-proclaimed mistrust of democratic forces, much less revolutionary ones, should have realized this. It's a testimony to his terrible psychological state that he didn't. Because he could easily at this point have made the issue of "safe passage" a condition of his abdication. Indeed, if he had done so, and the PG had been unable or unwilling to fulfill this obligation, then NII would have had absolutely legal grounds to oppose the PG and any government that succeeded it, in the interests of saving his family, or for that matter, regaining his throne (which was clearly Alexandra's objective, judging from her letters, right up until the family's last days in Ekaterinburg).
There's no denying Nicholas' fatalism and passivity, but I can't condemn him or Alexandra for the awful fate that befell his children later. Sadly, and ironically, the IF's unity and devotion to each other led them all to share the tragic end that only Nicholas may have deserved.
Why does everybody keep implying that I'm condemning N&A for "the awful fate that befell [their] children"? Ultimately the Bolsheviks bear all the blame for that, as murderers always do bear the blame for killing innocent people. I am merely pointing out that N&A as politicians -- and let's be real, they always wanted to be viewed as serious politicians -- made an entire series of miscalculations that contributed to their children's vulnerability. N&A were not politically astute, to put it mildly.
Obviously I don't agree that we should somehow blame private citizens like Anne Frank's parents for their decisions in keeping their family safe during an unprecedented event like the Holocaust. I brought that up earlier in the discussion.
However, I am pointing out here that Nicholas II and Alexandra Fedorovna were in a completely different situation than the Frank parents. First because the Russian Revolution of February/March 1917 was not a historically unprecedented event -- everybody who was educated in Russia knew that the French Revolution was the precedent and the warning for their own revolution. Secondly, Nicholas and Alexandra were first and foremost politicians, or at least so they imagined themselves, and in fact as emperor and empress of Russia they had wielded very real, indeed immense political power from 1894 until 1917, that is, for over two decades. For over 20 years they had possessed the actual power to affect the course of historical events. Moreover, they continued to believe, even an entire year after NII's abdication, that they were vital to the course of political events in post-revolutionary Russia (c.f., their delusional notion that the Bolsheviks needed NII to sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk). So why were they so incredibly naive in February/March 1917? Why didn't NII negotiate for the safe passage out of Russia of his family? Why didn't Alexandra, surrounded by her sick children, take it seriously when one of her oldest servitors at Tsarskoe Selo told her that when the house is burning down, the first people to be taken out are the invalids? Other people could clearly see the writing on the wall, why didn't they, with all their engrained, exaggerated fears of the evils of democracy and intellectuals, liberals and left-wingers and progressives, and so on and so forth?