The German experience in 1918-1919 is what should have happened in Russia in 1917-1918 but, unfortunately, didn't.
I tend to line up with James on the question of the dissimilarities between Germany and Russia at the end of World War I. Please excuse my repeating an earlier post from another thread, but it remains my view. That post, too, worked off a Klemperer observation quoted by Elisabeth (which I always find fascinating):
I wanted some time to think about the Klemperer quote. In fact, I largely agree with it. If there was to be a radicalization of German politics, I do not think it surprising that it would have had the characteristics of National Socialism. As I said earlier, German society had strains such as anti-semitism, xenophobia, a craving for order, a tendency toward extreme manifestation, and some degree of militarism -- all of which were drawn into a single, coherent (albeit absurd) philosophy by the Nazis.
But my point about the difference between Russian and German history was that I think a radicalization of German politicis was an "if" requiring a convergence of certain factors, whereas radicalization of Russian politics was more foreseeable over a wider range of scenarios.
Remember that Russia had already seen revolution only nine years before WWI began. Throughout the nineteenth century, elements of her population had consistently radicalized -- first the intelligentsia, then the skilled workers. The peasant craving for land redistribution was a pressure cooker forming its own head of steam. Murder was a staple of political life. A tsar was assassinated in 1881. The Governnor of Moscow was assassinated in 1905. The Prime Minister was assassinated in 1911. And, as you and James1941 pointed out on the "Assassinations" thread, there were innumerable assassinations -- far more than anywhere else in Europe -- of lower-level officials throughout the period. Wealth distribution was the most lopsided in the developed world. The middle class -- a great stabilizing force in any society -- constituted a smaller element of Russian society than in any other of the great powers. While all industrial workers had reason to complain throughout Europe, only in Russia was the state of regulation pulling back from a tentative experiment with a progressive policy. Only in Russia was the agrarian class ready to burn down manor houses at the drop of a hat, as they did in 1905. Only in Russia was organized violence by the civilian population, as manifested through pogroms, a recurrent habit into the 20th century.
It might have been hard to guess it would be the Bolsheviks specifically who came to power. But it was not hard to foresee that the tsarist regime would collapse and that a centrist democratic order would not be strong enough to contain whatever the explosive forces were that precipitated that collapse.
The situation in Germany was not remotely similar to that of Russia going into the Great War. Even when Germany was defeated, civil society remained stable. The Kaiser was allowed to skulk away to a genteel retirement. Germans, ready to give democracy a real chance, were nevertheless quite happy to leave the judiciary of imperial Germany intact to exert a conservative brake on their new democracy. War heroes, people from the landed gentry, and people closely associated with the old regime were elected to the new offices. Left to her own devices, a prostrate Germany had the ability to pick herself up and move on.
What destabilized Germany's experiment with democracy was not the latent forces embedded in her body politic. It was the destruction of the German economy by reparations payments and the hyper-inflation that literally wiped out the entire middle class of the nation.
Any society can radicalize in the right circumstances. People today forget how nervous some politicians in the U.S. were in the early 1930's about the forces unleashed here by the Great Depression. We forget that social and political changes unleashed by our rather short involvement in the Great War spawned a huge upsurge in Ku Klux Klan membership and activity. And just look at how ready Americans were in the aftermath of 9/11 to swallow fabricated information and to attack another sovereign nation without provocation. Imagine what we might have done and how many more Patriot Acts to curtail our civil rights we would have passed had there been another similar attack within, say, a year.
Once Germany radicalized, it doesn't surprise me that she produced a Hitler. It was the radicalization itself that would not have been foreseeable to a student of German history but for the intervening external imposition of crushing reparations payments. I simply do not believe that a student of Russian history would have had as much trouble foreseeing a collapse of tsarism and some new form of autocratic government replacing it.