VERDICT IN RE PEOPLE V NICHOLAS II ALEXANDROVICH
The Court as Trier of Fact does make the following FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Emperor Nicholas II on the date in question Sunday 9 January 1905 (Bloody Sunday) was the ultimate authority in the Military Chain of Command with respect to the St. Petersburg Military District. While actual authority had been delegated to Grand Duke Vladimir and thence by Ukaze to General Prince Vasil'chikov, such delegation of authority does not sui generis remove the Defendant from culpability for the actions of subordinates. The Ukaze granting such authority itself provides the evidence that Defendant did ultimately possess such authority in the first place. Further evidence is provided by the subsequent "assumption of all military control" during World War I. This act is seen by the Court as the ultimate military authority merely removing the a priori delegation of such authority to others and subsequently resuming direct control and authority for himself. We reject Defense counsel's assertion that because Defendant did not himself somehow assume "actual" military authority until 23 August 1914 that he somehow was not a superior authority to those to whom Defendant had delegated that authority. We refer Defense counsel to the Nuremburg trials for crimes against humanity where this same defense ("I wasn't actually in charge, a subordinate was...") was rejected on numerous occasions.
2. Prosecution states: to prove murder in law the prosecution must prove:
(a) Mens rea, (the mental side of making a decision to unlawfully kill and individual,
This Court finds no evidence presented that Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich did in fact have Mens Rea to unlawfully kill any individual or group of individuals. We find no evidence submitted to substantiate any notion that Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich personally ordered his subordinates to "Shoot to Kill" during the period of Martial Law declared, nor specifically on Bloody Sunday.
3. This Court finds that Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich did not fail to exercise control properly over any person under his effective command and control or his effective authority and control, which led to the events in question. Rather, both sides have provided evidence that Defendant received regular reports and information of events, and was in fact under the genuine knowledge and belief that his subordinates were performing their duties properly. There was no evidence introduced that it was somehow forseeable that Defendant should have known of or expected a failure in the regular and routine lines of communication to him from subordinates.
4. Since Defendant was in reality mistaken in his perceived knowledge and belief about the performance of the duties by subordinates, was Defendant Nicholas II criminally negligent in failing to know that his subordinates were about to commit, or were committing offenses? There is no evidence introduced to indicate that Defendant had done anything less than he could reasonably be expected to do. He received regular reports, satisfied himself reasonably that peace had been restored to St. Petersburg. The cancellation of Martial Law is telling evidence that Defendant was in fact genuinely satisfied that St. Petersburg was again peaceful and unrest was quelled. The actions of Gapon and the demonstrators were obviously unforseeable at the time. Had Gapon telegraphed the Defendant in advance to request an audience, this may have been different, but Defendant could not reasonably know what was to occur. We find no evidence of criminal negligence on the part of Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich.
5. Did Defendant breach his responsibility as a Superior? The law cited by the Prosecution states:
a superior commits an indictable offence if
(d) the superior subsequently
(1) fails to take, as soon as practicable, all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of the offence, or the further commission of offences under section 4 or 6 or
(2) fails to take, as soon as practicable, all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
The evidence clearly demonstrates that Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich did nothing whatsoever after the events of Bloody Sunday with respect to the subsequent investigation of the actual events to determine the causes thereof; that Defendant did nothing to take any reasonable measure to prevent further commission of the offenses; nor did Defendant take any measures whatsoever to prosecute those actually responsible for the offenses of Bloody Sunday.
Therefore, the Court finds and rules in this matter as follows:
As to Count I of the indictment, the charge of the Capital Crime of "Murder in the First Degree, for the events of Sunday 9 January 1905 in Palace Square, St. Petersburg Russia,
the Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich is NOT GUILTY.
As to the lesser-included Crime of "Breach of Responsibility as a Superior", for the events of Sunday 9 January 1905 in Palace Square, St. Petersburg Russia,
the Defendant Nicholas II Alexandrovich is GUILTY.
29 May 2006
Rob Moshein
Presiding Judge
